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The most vital foreign policy goals of the govern-
ment of any country, are to provide for the physical securi-
ty of the nation, and economic prosperity of its people.
Although it is often difficult to evaluate foreign policy
decisions on a strictly rational basis, ultimately the
survival of the country depends on how successfully leaders
achieve these objectives. Foreign policy "interests" in
areas beyond the territorial confines of the nation are
determined by the degree to which they contribute to the
enhancement of the vital goals of security and prosperity.
The first, and most basic of the two objectives is
security. At the very minimum, security refers to the
territorial integrity and political independence of the
state. Although security includes the perpetuation of the
values, life-styles, patterns of social relations, and other
elements that give a state its identity, security has
traditionally been measured primarily in terms of military
strength. Such a measurement includes not only independent
strength, but also alliances, or combined military power.
The ultimate rational basis for maintaining military
strength is to provide for the physical survival of the
nation. In the case of alliances, their success and dura-
bility is largely determined by the degree of security
provided for all parties to the agreement. Although there
have been rare instances where a state's security has been

preserved through a policy of unarmed neutrality, such a
policy is risky as it relies on the actions of other
nations for basic guarantees of territorial integrity and
political independence.
Prosperity, or economic well-being, is interrelated
with physical security. The elements of economic well-being
are relatively few: natural resources, degree of self-sus-
tenance, imports and exports, education level of the popula-
tion, transportation system (internal and external) , and
industrial development level. The overall level of prosper-
ity achieved by a nation depends upon the ability to max-
imize each of the categories, and security plays a key role
in providing that ability.
If a nation must substitute imports for natural resources
it lacks, the freedom to do so is clearly a security object-
ive. Vital or strategic minerals not present within the
borders of a state must be available from abroad if the
elements of security are to be maintained. Such an objective
can be attained by creating and maintaining stability in
the world system through the processes of international
relations, either diplomatic understanding or projection
of military power. Pursuit of policies designed to establish
and maintain a world order compatible with the survival and
prosperity of the nation are the ultimate goals of any
nation's involvement in the world arena.
Historically, the first step taken by the United States

in foreign policy was to establish security for its own
borders. Its original problems, of course, resulted from its
conflicts with European colonial powers. Once continental
security was guaranteed, the United States began to gradually
project its power and influence in foreign affairs beyond
its own borders.
The first area that was considered vital to US security
was the rest of the Western Hemisphere. As early as the
Monroe Doctrine, the US declared to colonial powers that it
considered the new world an area of particular interest.
By preempting attempts by European powers to build military
bases which could threaten the borders of the United States,
the ring of US security was widened considerably. At the
time of the Monroe Doctrine the United States lacked military
power to back up the declaration and the doctrine's success
was due largely to the understanding of England and the
strength of the British fleet. Nevertheless, the Doctrine
played a key role in US policy as recently as the Cuban
missile crisis.
With regard to Western Europe, until World War I the
United States had not become actively involved in European
conflicts. Isolation, recommended by the founding fathers,
was deemed adequate as a policy toward Europe. As long
as there was no feeling that Europe could be dominated by
any single country, the US was content to remain relatively
isolated from European politics. The European threat to the

American way of life during World War I, and again during
World War 11/ was not a threat of invasion. The United
States decision to go to war in both cases was to prevent the
formation of a unified Europe, with a system antagonistic to
the US, under a militaristic centralized direction. Such a
situation could have produced an ultimate direct threat to
the physical survival of the United States, and thus had to
be resisted in the opinion of the US government. Because of
the concentration of industrial and technological power in
Western Europe, the potential threat to the United States
made it prudent to act to prevent dominance of that area by
hostile powers.
Following World War II and the elimination of facism
(or Naziism) as a threat to US security, the United States
did not retreat to its former policy of isolation with regard
to Europe. It had become clear to American leaders that the
United States must actively pursue policies which would
prevent hegemony of Europe by hostile powers. Facism was
rapidly replaced by Communism as the force to counteract
in Europe, and the war-torn allies of the United States
were too weak to meet the task. The Truman Point Four
program and the iMarshall Plan were enacted to rebuild the
European allies and prevent communist hegemony. It became
clear to US leaders that a permanent military alliance was
desirable to offset Soviet military power and the NATO
pact was entered to perform that role. The NATO alliance

continues to pledge US military forces in a commitment to
prevent hegemony of Western Europe by a hostile power.
The East Asian area, like Europe, represents a large
pool of resources which, if under single management, could
threaten the security of the United States. The rise of
communication and technology, especially air service, brought
the Far East closer, and World War II drove home the idea
that the Far East, as much as Europe and the Western Hemisphere
had to be included in the determination of US vital interests.
In Asia, as in Europe, during World War II, the United States
was not threatened with an invasion of its homeland. However,
the potential threat to the United States was made clear
by the bombing of Pearl Harbor. The prospect of a unified
East Asia under the direction of Japan was unacceptable to
US leaders.
Following World War II the United States was faced with
a situation in Asia similar to Western Europe. As the spectre
of a communist threat replaced that of Japan, the US moved
to fill the power vacuum in Asia. Events in East Asia during
the half dozen years following World War II brought the United
States to the realization that a strong and friendly Japan
was extremely important to its policy of preventing hostile
hegemony in East Asia.
In the three regions of the Western Hemisphere, Western
Europe, and the Far East, the United States has historically
proven its interests were so vital it would be willing to
10

engage in general war to maintain them. The intrinsic value
of these three regions to US security is such that they remain
the primary areas of US foreign policy interests. In the
Western Hemisphere, the Cuban missile crisis demonstrated the
US government's belief in the importance of its interests
there. In Europe, US involvement in World Wars I and II
exemplifies US interest. In East Asia, World War II, and to
a lesser extent the Korean and Vietnam Wars showed US willing-
ness to engage in war to protect what it considered to be
its vital interests. In the Western Hemisphere the US seeks
to maintain its own dominance; in Western Europe and East
Asia it seeks to prevent the dominance of another power.
In the short period of time between the end of World
War II and the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, sweeping
changes took place in world power alignments. Germany and
Japan, wartime enemies, became postwar allies, while the
Soviet Union and mainland China, wartime allies, became post-
war enemies. Forces of rising nationalism in prewar European
colonies contributed to the creation of a world system vastly
different from the one that existed prior to World War II.
During this period, battlelines in the Cold War were
drawn. Containment of communism became the primary method
of attaining US policy goals; the defeat of American imperial-
ism became the battle cry of communists throughout the world.
The US extended its influence to become a dominant world
power while the USSR, as the chief center of world communism,
11

expanded its own sphere of operations. The US goal of pre-
venting single power dominance in East Asia was aimed at both
the Soviet Union and China, representing what was felt to be
a monolithic threat of world communism. While the USSR and
the PRC formed their alliance and cooperated to develop their
mutual strength, the United States countered with a chain of
alliances aimed at surrounding the communist countries.
During the early 1950s a policy of "massive retaliation" was
asserted by the United States. Japan became the United States'
most important Asian supporter in the drive for the containment
of communism in the East Asian area.
During the Allied Occupation of Japan following World War
II, the relationship between the United States and Japan changed
drastically. This was accomplished in a short period of six
years from September 1945 to September 1951. The strategic
location of Japan and its tremendous military potential brought
the United States to the realization that an alliance with
Japan would be an important asset in furthering US security
objectives in East Asia. The realization was slow in coming.
During the Occupation there were many who felt that Japan should
be punished and prevented from rebuilding its economy rather
than rehabilitated and made strong again. The importance
of rebuilding Japan and allying with it became clear as
communist governments consolidated power in China and North
Korea in the late 1940s, and the idea was hastened by the
outbreak of hostilities in Korea.
12

Since 1951, Japan has become the only country in East
Asia whose intrinsic value to US security is so great that
its loss would irreparably harm the US objective of preventing
dominance of Asia by hostile powers. In no other western
Pacific nation can US interests begin to compare in importance
with those in Japan. US commitments to other Pacific nations,
although important, are of lesser consequence. With the
spectacular rise of the Japanese economy since World War II,
the importance of Japan to US security objectives has become
even more clear. Today, Japan has a highly developed economy
with the third highest GNP in the world, and second only to
the US in the non-communist world. Japan is the United States'
second largest trading partner behind Canada, and the volume
of oceanic trade between the US and Japan is the largest of
any two countries in the world. Strategically, Japan's
location in an area where the Soviet Union and China both have
vital interests is important to the US. By maintaining an
alliance with Japan, the United States has been able to
further its goal of preventing hegemony in the area by forces
hostile to it.
Moreover, Japan is potentially a great military power
itself. With its broad industrial base and advanced technology
Japan could easily become a powerful military, as well as
economic force in Asia. Japan has the industrial capacity
and techonolgy to easily outproduce China in both nuclear
and conventional arms. Japan's potential military power
13

makes it a far more important US interest than any other
1
state in East Asia. A continuing reason for the US
alliance with Japan is to preclude the necessity for Japan
to have a large military which could threaten stability
in East Asia.
The main goal of this paper is to examine the military
aspects of the US-Japan mutual security relationship.
Although there are many economic factors in the alliance this
paper will attempt to deal with them only as they affect
security policy. The goal of US policy in East Asia has
been to prevent hegemony by any power or powers hostile to
the United States. The alliance between the US and Japan
has been an important factor in achieving that goal and
enhancing US security. The decision to ally with Japan
was an important one in US diplomatic history. Because of
the far-reaching implications that decision has fostered
for the United States in the post-World War II era, it is
important and useful to review how and why the decision was
reached.
In the period following Japan's surrender there was
little unanimity among the allies, or within the United
States itself, concerning Japan's post-war future. Fear
and suspicion of Japan ran high in the minds of other Pacific
nations. The entire Asian-Pacific policy and alliance
1





system of the US was affected by the fears of these nations.
The context of the mutual security relationship of the United
States and Japan must be viewed in relation to the larger
system of alliances formed by the United States in Asia
because it was formed with them in the minds of US leaders
.
Because of this the US-Japan alliance will be discussed
in terms of the diplomatic maneuvering of which it was a part.
Although the act of signing an alliance can be placed
in time as a static event, the functioning of it cannot.
The US-Japan alliance has been constantly adjusted since it
was signed in 1951. Roles and relationships between the two
parties have altered considerably since the alliance's in-
ception. When Japan signed the document it was weak and
defenseless, economically as well as militarily. It had no
military to speak of and no economy capable of supporting
one. As a result, it was left to the United States to provide
the bulk of manpower and equipment for the defense of Japan.
The phase of the alliance characterized by large US military
aid and troop commitments occured between 1950 and 1960.
Although there are still some US forces stationed in Japan,
and although US military aid to Japan continued into the late
1960s, a series of decisions between 1957 and 1960 altered the
basic concept of the roles of the two parties. These decisions
led to a formal revision of the security agreement in 1960.
The revised security treaty reflects the changing role
and status of the two countries in their joint security
15

efforts. Japan had rebuilt its economy substantially by 1960
and had regained confidence and self-esteem. It was no longer
acceptable to operate under the restrictions of the original
security treaty. The desire for revision on the part of
Japan did not indicate a weakening of the alliance, rather
it showed a desire for a more equitable and more equal
partnership. The result was the revised security arrangement
which is still in force.
New modes of military transfers to Japan accompanied
the revised security agreement. The Foreign Military Sales
(FMS) program, commercial sales, and licenses to manufacture
equipment replaced Grant Aid as the means of transferring
arms and training to Japan's Self Defense Forces.
In 1957, Japan launched the first of its defense buildup
programs to fulfill its new role under the revised treaty.
The defense programs and US military sales to Japan are two
parts of a coordinated plan which were the result of Japan's
attempt to develop a coherent philosophy of defense. More
attention was focused on long range planning concerning
the proper size, capability, role, and equipment of the
Self Defense Forces. As a result, Japan began to separate
its vital interests from those of the United States and
embark on a more independent course in foreign affairs.
Gradually during the decade of the 1960s and continuing
through the mid-1970s, Japan began to cautiously rebuild the
capability of its arms industry. Through a push-pull process
16

of domestic and international political maneuvering Japan has
attempted to work around constraints resulting from World
War II and build a sophisticated embryo of military forces
and the means to equip them.
It was inevitable that Japan's tremendous economic growth
during the 1960s and 1970s would create a new image in the
minds of Japanese leaders of their role and importance in the
US-Japan alliance. At the same time, US leaders looked at
the growing balance of payments deficit with Japan and ques-
tioned the equitability of the costs of the alliance. En-
mities, which might have been foreseen and negotiated at an
early stage, were allowed to grow until they became intolerable
The Nixon "shocks" of the early 1970s resulted. The method
applied by President Nixon to adjust the alliance relationship
shook it to its foundation.
Other strains of political and psychological origins
have affected the alliance. Differences of opinion about the
value of the alliance to Japan and the US have led to enmities
between the two countries. Although efforts are being made
to clarify the value of the alliance, strains still exist.
The purpose of outlining the evolution of the US-Japan
security agreement is to evaluate its validity. The world
scene has changed drastically since the original pact was
signed in 1951, and even since its revision in 1960. Has
the alliance kept pace with these changes, or has it outlived
its usefulness? The criteria must be the ability of the
17

alliance to continue to meet the security needs of the two
parties. Should its validity be found lacking, what then are
the alternative courses of action? If it is the US objective
to prevent hostile hegemony in East Asia, how does the security
pact with Japan further that objective? The agreement has
been revised once to reflect the changing roles and demands
of the parties. Perhaps a new revision is in order. Even
though the present security treaty may still be adequate,
there are actions which could be taken by both the United
States and Japan to increase its effectiveness.
18

II. ORIGINS OF THE US COMMITMENT TO THE DEFENSE OF JAPAN
1945-1951
A. THE Defacto GUARANTEE OF THE ALLIED OCCUPATION
Although the US agreement to aid in the defense of Japan
was not formalized until the return of Japanese sovereignty
in 1952, the actual commitment began with the surrender of
Japan to General Douglas MacArthur on 2 Sept 194 5. General
MacArthur represented the combined Allied Forces that had
been at war with Japan; however, the United States played
the primary role in providing Japanese security during the
ensuing Occupation of Japan. Within a few short weeks, the
military of Japan was disbanded and General MacArthur said
on 16 October 1945 that:
"Today the Japanese Armed Forces throughout Japan
completed their demobilization and ceased to exist as
such. These forces are now completely abolished. .
.
Everything military, naval or air is forbidden to
Japan. This ends its military might and its military
influence in international affiars. It no longer
reckons as a world power either large or small." ^
The significance of General MacArthur ' s statement was
difficult for Americans to appreciate. For well over half a
millenium the Japanese had lived in a society dominated by
military rule, culminating in World War II. In 1945 they
were suddenly stripped of military forces and placed under
the tutelage and protection of conquerors. Now the same
military leaders who had ruled Japan were tried as war
criminals by Allied military courts and the International
2




Military Tribunal for the Far East. All career military
men were purged from public life and defense industries
were dismantled or destroyed. In addition, restrictions
were placed on war industries and the Japanese Constitution
was soon rewritten renouncing war and prohibiting military
forces and war potential.
During the first few years of the Allied Occupation,
little thought was given to the future defense of Japan.
According to the Potsdam formula, attention was instead
focused on preventing Japan from again menacing the peace
in Asia. Reform of economic and social flaws and the
elimination of militarism, which the Allies felt had led to
World War, took priority. The Occupation forces, of which
75% were US troops, constituted a defacto security guarantee.
It became obvious to General MacArthur at the outset of
the Occupation that the US contingent of the garrison was
necessary to protect Japan from being divided into occupation
zones such as had occured in postwar Germany. In 19 4 5 the
Soviets pressed for a separate occupation of Hokkaido not under
General MacArthur as Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP)
.
MacArthur refused even though General Derevyanko, commander
of Soviet forces, threatened to move Soviet troops into Hokkaido
without MacArthur' s permission. General MacArthur told the
Soviet commander that "...if a single Soviet soldier entered
Japan without my authority, I would at once throw the entire
20

3Russian mission, including himself, into jail." This
was probably the first statement of intent by the US
military to protect the Japanese from a Soviet military
threat in Asia.
Although General MacArthur had to cope with attempts
to disrupt the internal security of Japan, external security
was not felt to be threatened until the perception of comm-
unism as a world force became stronger. The famous Kennan
"X Article," calling for containment of communism appeared
in the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs , and was directed
primarily against Russia. The Chinese communists under Mao
Tse-tung consolidated power and founded the People's Republic
of China in October 1949, and meanwhile the communists
consolidated their regimes in Outer Mongolia, North Korea and
North Vietnam. The communist hand showed itself in internal
rebellions throughout Southeast Asia and the communist-non-
communist cold war became hot war in Korea in 1950. The alarm
generated in the United States as a result of these events,
as well as the consolidation of Soviet power and hegemony
in Eastern Europe, combined to motivate the United States to
make plans for contributing to the defense of postwar Japan.
Even during the cold war days of 1948, the goals of the Occupation
had changed from protecting Asia from the Japanese menace






The overriding US foreign policy objective remained that of
preventing hegemony of East Asia by a hostile ideology or
group of powers.
B. THE US POSTWAR TREATY SYSTEM
During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the United States
established alliances and mutual defense agreements with forty-
two nations in an effort to put its security goals in action.
The first of these, signed in 1947, was the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (known as the Rio Pact) . This
agreement, which included twenty Central and South American
republics, underscored the mutual objective of maintaining
the Western Hemisphere free of outside military aggression.
In 194 9 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
was formed. This agreement included the United States and
Canada, plus ten European nations. By 1952 West Germany, Greece
and Turkey had acceded to the treaty, raising the number of
signatories to fifteen. Both the Rio Pact and the NATO
Alliance have a very strongly worded action (or "trigger")
clause calling for an attack on any one of the members to be
4
considered an attack on all. These are the only two alliances
the United States is a member of which call for immediate
reaction in event of attack. Since the United States is by far
the strongest partner in both treaties, this wording further
4
US Congress, Collective Defense Treaties
,
p. 22 and
p. 77, US Government Printing Office, 1967.
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establishes how vital the Western Hemisphere and Western
Europe are to US security objectives.
In 1951 the United States signed mutual defense treaties
with the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and Japan.
This formed the beginning of US involvement in Asian alliances.
In 1953 the Republic of Korea and the US signed a mutual
security agreement; a year later a similar pact was signed by
the Republic of China and the US. In addition to these
bilateral and trilateral agreements, the United States was
instrumental in forming the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization
CSEATO) with seven other governments in 1954. None of these
agreements is worded as strongly as the Rio Pact and NATO
Alliance. The Asian-Pacific treaties state that the parties
recognize that an armed attack in that region would be
dangerous to their peace and security and would be dealt with
"in accordance with. . .constitutional processes." None of these
agreements applies to the continental United States; however,
they do apply to attacks on the US in their respective treaty
5
areas.
Although the United States is not a member of the Central
Treaty Organization (formerly the Baghdad Pact) , it did agree
in 1959 to assist Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran in support of the
pact. Under the terms of the bilateral agreements between
the US and these threemembers of the treaty organization, the
5
Ibid.
, p. 82, 89, 92, 94 and 101
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United States provided military and economic assistance
as well as the promise of "appropriate action, including
the use of armed forces" in case of aggression against
6
them.
The period between 1947 and 1954 has been referred to
as one of "pactomania" in US diplomatic history. The series
of treaties entered into by the United States formed the
basis for the US commitment to the defense of certain non-
communist states against communist aggression in the Cold
War period. Although the strength of the treaties varied,
together they demonstrated the conviction that the limited
defense of certain non-communist nations was important to
US foreign interests.
C. NEGOTIATING THE JAPANESE TREATY
Initially, the guiding objective of the Occupation forces
in Japan was to prevent the recurrence of conditions which had
led to Japan's imperial and militarist policies. There was
little thought of forming an alliance with Japan. The overall
concept of the Occupation, according to the Potsdam formula,
was
:
"To insure that Japan will not again become a
menace to the United States or to the peace and security
of the world. . .Japan will be completely disarmed and
demilitarized. The authority of the militarists and the








her political, economic, and social life."
Although the harshness of this decree faded as the
Occupation progressed, the initial post-surrender policy
formed the basis for early drafts of a Japanese peace
treaty.
There was no clearcut agreement among US officials
concerning the post-occupation peace and security provisions
for Japan. General MacArthur and certain State Department
officials favored an early peace treaty which would give legal
form to the principles of the Post-Surrender Policy Directive.
However, there were others in the Navy and Army who envisaged
an indefinite occupation, following a preliminary treaty
which would not restore full sovereignty to Japan but would
re-establish diplomatic relations. This would have allowed
the United States to retain strategic forward bases in Japan
free of interference. General MacArthur was convinced that
the Japanese had been reformed by the events of war and defeat
and should be reinstated in the community of nations. Early
in 194 6, he stated that "Japan today understands as thoroughly
as any nation that war does not pay... her spiritual revolution
8
has been probably the greatest the world has ever seen."
7
US Department of State, The Occupation of Japan; Policy
and Progress
, p. 74, US Government Printing Office, 1946.
8
Supreme Commander Allied Powers, Government Section, The
Political Reorientation of Japan
,




MacArthur also advised that Japan be allowed no armed
forces beyond a police force sufficent to deal with internal
disorders. Instead, Japan should remain disarmed and rely
9
on the United Nations for its defense.
In 1946, with the conflict of opinion of whether or not
Japan should be given a punitive treaty settlement still un-
resolved, the State Department drafted a tentative treaty.
This agreement, which was formally submitted to the govern-
ments of the United Kingdom, the USSR, and China on 21 June
1946, reflected the Post-Surrender Policy Directive. The
preamble stated:
"It remains to ensure that the total disarmament and
demilitarization of Japan will be enforced as long as the
peace and security of the world may require. Only this
assurance will permit the nations of Asia and the world
to return singlemindedly to the habits of peace. "10
This draft paralleled a similar agreement put forward at
approximately the same time for a settlement in Germany.
Although not specifically stated, the draft implied that the
four powers would directly control Japan's security indef-
initely.
Furthermore, the draft called for a four power Commission
of Control with authority to ensure the continued demilitar-
ization of Japan after the Occupation. If the commission
9
Wheeler-Bennett, John and Nicholls, Anthony, The Semblance
of Peace





were to find a violation of the disarmament and demilitariza-
tion clauses, the signatories would "take such prompt action
—
including action by air, sea or land forces—as may be necessary
to assure the immediate cessation or prevention of such violation
11
or attempted violation." The treaty was to remain in force
for twenty-five years.
As early as the Moscow Conference of December 1945, the
draft treaties calling for the disarmament of Germany and
Japan were discussed. Stalin tacitly accepted the terms laid
down for Japan by accepting similar ones for Germany. In July
194 6, however, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov, rejected
the idea of joint allied control over the disarmament of
Germany. Because of Soviet opposition to such a treaty with
Germany, the United States felt it would not be worthwhile to
press for similar terms for Japan. Although MacArthur and
Secretary of State Byrnes agreed that a peace treaty with
Japan should be concluded as soon as possible, the matter
was delayed because of the Soviet attitude.
In March 1947, the United States again produced a draft
treaty which was transmitted to Britain, China and the USSR.
This draft, written by Dr. Hugh Borton, Chief of the State
Department's Division for Japanese Affairs, and Dr. Ruth
Bacon of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, was similar to the
previous treaty. Although the draft was never published,
11
US Department of State, The Occupation of Japan: Policy
and Progress
, pp. 85-88, US Government Printing Office, 1946.
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it has been summarized in other publications. The term of the
treaty was to be twenty-five years, and Japan was to have
no military forces or potential other than police. The treaty
called for a strict interpretation of Article IX of the Jap-
anese constitution which renounced all war-making capability.
Inspection and enforcement of the restrictions were to be carried
out by an Allied Commission of Inspection working under a
Council of Ambassadors made up of members of the Far Eastern
12
Commission.
The United States requested a conference to be held in
August 1947 to discuss the terms of the draft treaty. For
various reasons the conference was never held. In Canberra,
Britain and other Commonwealth nations were already planning
to meet during the same time to discuss the Japanese situation.
The Soviet Union and China refused to attend the conference
in Washington because of differences of opinion on veto rights
on provisions of the draft. The United States, faced with
Chineseand Soviet intransigence, and British prior commitments,
cancelled the meeting and resigned itself to tabling the desire
for an early peace.
In retrospect, it was fortunate for the United States
that neither of the first draft treaties was enacted. By
early 1950, when the peace treaty with Japan was again actively
1972.
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pursued, world events had drastically altered US terms for
a Japanese peace treaty. The communist threat to Western
Europe and East Asia had increased in severity during the
1947 to 1950 period. Because of British inability to continue
aid to Greece and Turkey, the United States had chosen to assume
that obligation to prevent a communist takeover. This was
followed by the Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1948, and the
Chinese communist victory of 1949. US forces had withdrawn
from South Korea by August 1948, and during the years 1949
and 1950, it had become increasingly clear that the Soviet
Union was strengthening the North Koreans in the event of
war against the South.
In June 1950, hostilities in Korea broke out, and the
United States once again went to war in East Asia to halt
"cynical, naked and brutal aggression." The combination of
events of the Cold War convinced the United States that the
idea of a punitive and restrictive peace treaty for Japan
should be replaced with one that would rebuild Japan as a
strong anti-communist force in East Asia.
As the US posture on the terms of a peace treaty with
Japan began to change to favor a non-punitive peace, the issue
of Japanese security, and the security of non-communist nations
in Asia gradually became linked together. Within the State
Department, however, the concept of a punitive treaty died
hard. In a new draft written in September 194 9 there was
little change from the Borton draft of January 1948. Although
29

it did not call for reparation payments, it did contain restric-
tions on Japanese sovereignty and on the nation's war-making
capability. The Japanese were not to be permitted to engage
in war industries, and troops, 8 5% of them US, were to be
13
stationed in Japan indefinitely.
By October 1949, a partial draft of a non-punitive treaty
had been completed by the State Department. This was the first
of the draft treaties which recognized the change in world
power alignments resulting from the Cold War. This treaty
called for the termination of all Allied control of Japan, and
had no provision for any type of inspection team to insure that
Japan was maintaining no military forces. Although the treaty
still contained clauses which required Japan to pay reparations
for the war, as well as promise to maintain democratic processes,
other economic and agrarian reforms were to be left to the
Japanese government. This change of attitude on the part of
the United States reflected President Truman's National Security
Council's recommendation of November 1948 to reduce the size
of General MacArthur's staff and turn more responsibility
over to the Japanese government. This eased the strains between
the United States and Japan and changed the tenor of the







The Japanese Government under Yoshida, Katayama, and
Ashida, as Prime Ministers, had consistently hoped since 1947
that some sort of security agreement could be worked out with
the United States after the Occupation.. Although it was
suggested at one time by George Atcheson that perhaps Japan
should refer its security to the United Nations, the Japanese
government felt that it would be a considerable length of
time before that body would be able to guarantee Japan's
security. Prime Minister Katayama transmitted these feelings
through a document drawn up by Foreign Minister Ashida and
Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, Nishio, and written in the
name of the Head of the Central Laison Office, Tadakatsu
Suzuki. This document stated that while Japan was in a position
to deal with internal disturbances without outside aid, the
best means of safeguarding her independence for the present
was to enter into a special pact with the United States against
external aggression.
Although the document did not formally request the continued
stationing of US troops in Japan after the peace treaty,
there did not seem to be any other way to guarantee Japanese
14
security. The document prepared by the Katayama government
was accepted without change by the Yoshida cabinet and remained
the Japanese government's position througout the negotiations
14




leading to the treaty settlement in 1951.
No particular date can be given to the US decision to
provide for Japanese security in the post-Occupation period,
but it was relatively slow in coming compared to the non-
punitive peace treaty idea. George Kennan, then director
of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, felt that
the US should "devise policies toward Japan which would assure
the security of that country from Communist penetration and
15
domination as well as from military attack by the Soviet Union."
He was dismayed, however, on a special mission to Japan for
Secretary of State Marshall in 1948, that there was no US
planning to provide for a US security guarantee of Japan after
the Occupation. Largely as a result of Kennan ' s efforts,
US planners began to seriously consider the future security
of Japan.
By early 1950, the United States, although still without
a specific plan, linked Japanese security with US worldwide
defense commitments. In his famous speech to the National
Press Club on January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson
stated:
"...the defeat and the disarmament of Japan have placed
upon the United States the necessity of assuming the military
defense of Japan so long as that is required, both in the
interest of our security and in the interests of the security
of the entire Pacific area and, in all honor, in the interest
of Japanese security...! can assure you that there is no
15
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intention of any sort of abandoning or weakening the defenses
of Japan. . .that defense must and shall be maintained."-'-"
Although Mr. Acheson's speech is most remembered for not
including South Korea in US. defense commitments, there was
no doubt that by 1950, the US considered Japan's security
to be a US responsibility.
This position was further consolidated the following
month when the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of
China announced a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual
Assistance which was directed specifically at Japan. According
to Article I of that document:
"Both High Contracting Parties undertake jointly to take
all the necessary measures at their disposal for the purpose
of preventing a repetition of aggression and violation of
peace on the part of Japan or any other state which should
unite with Japan, directly or indirectly, in acts of agg-
ression. "1'
By this time the United States had already established
that South Korea would not be included in plans for an East
Asian security system. As early as March 2, 1949, General
MacArthur, in an interview with London Daily Mail correspond-
ent G. Ward Price, stated:
" It (the US Asian defense line) starts from the Phil-
ippines and continues through the Ryukyu Archipelago
which includes its main bastion, Okinawa. Then it bends
16
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back through Japan and the Aleutian chain to Alaska."-1-**
This concept was confirmed by Acheson's speech in January
1950. Most of the US troops, including all ground combat
units, had been withdrawn from Korea during 1948 and 1949,
and the United States apparently felt that the two Koreas
would provide buffer zones advantageous to both the US and
the communists.
US authorities in Japan began to focus attention on
leftists, rather than rightists, and worried more about
communist subversion than resurgence of militarism. The
concept of the future Japan as a peaceful "Switzerland of
Asia" gave way to a new image of a Japan which could become
a non-communist defense stronghold in Asia. General MacArthur,
in his New Year's message of 1950 emphasized that Japan had
not forfeited the inherent right of self defense and spoke
no more about the surrender of sovereign rights to rearm.
When Secretary Acheson appointed John Foster Dulles his
Special Ambassador to negotiate a peace treaty between Japan
and her former enemies in May 1950, there were several pro-
blems that had to be considered. As the Secretary said, he
had to reckon with four groups: the Communists, the pentagon,
US allies, and the former enemy, and that, of the four, the
Communists gave the least trouble. Dulles asked Secretary
18
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Acheson for a year in which to negotiate a peace treaty and
security treaty with Japan. Within a year and four months
after receiving the assignment, both documents were signed
in San Francisco.
Dulles realized that the only way to ensure an outcome
favorable to the United States' security interests in East
Asia was to foreclose any Soviet opportunity to sabotage the
peace negotiations. He had just returned from his first visit
to Japan in June 1950 when the North Koreans invaded South
Korea. This event, combined with the Sino-Soviet Treaty of
February 1950 and the desperate need for US bases in Japan
to support forces in Korea, convinced Dulles that the Soviets
would do anything possible to disrupt Japanese peace and
security treaty negotiations. As a result, his plan was to
inform the USSR of all positions and progress of the talks,
but to make sure that they had no opportunity to subvert
US objectives. Dulles stated in August 1951 that "Throughout
this period (of negotiations) the Soviet Union took an active,
though non-cooperative part. I had several conferences with
Yakov Malik and our Governments have exchanged ten memoranda
19
and drafts." He rejected, however, Soviet claims that the
Council of Foreign Ministers, formed at Potsdam on 17 July
1945, was the only body empowered to draw up a peace treaty
19
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with Japan. Although there may have been some basis for the
Soviet claim, Dulles held that the right of the Council of
Foreign Ministers to draw up a peace treaty was limited to
Germany. Without the veto the Soviets would have attained
in that body, they were effectively blocked by the United
States from influencing the treaty negotiations.
The communist government of China supported the Soviet
position, but this was not the main area of concern to Dulles
with that country. The problem of China was a question of
which government—Communist or Nationalist—represented the
Chinese. The United States maintained that the Nationalist
government under Chiang Kai-shek was the legal government;
however, the British had agreed to recognize the communists
under Mao Tse-tung. Neither the US or UK was willing to
participate in an agreement with the Chinese government
recognized by the other. This problem was solved during
Dulles 1 visit to London in June 1951. The solution, according
to a White House communique, "did not require any compromise
20
of principle by anyone." The Americans and British simply
agreed that neither Chinese government would be invited to
participate in the negotiations or signing of a treaty with
Japan. Although this merely postponed the problem of which





territories renounced by Japan, the agreement helped to ensure
that the San Francisco conference would progress smoothly.
In summary, Dulles dealt with the communist problem by
ignoring Soviet claims and demands while keeping them informed
through formal diplomatic channels. This was supplemented
by agreement with the British that neither the Communist or
Nationalist Chinese would be invited to take part in a treaty
of peace with Japan. The Taipei Government was, however,
kept informed by the US of the subsequent developments towards
the conclusion of a treaty. A similar office was performed
for the Peking Government by the Soviet Union.
United States military leaders were probably the most
obstinate group that Ambassador Dulles and Secretary Acheson
21
had to deal with. Bases which US forces had occupied since
194 5 had become an integral part of the US military presence
in East Asia. Unlike other overseas bases, US military install-
ations in Japan were unfettered by problems of host country
sovereignty. As long as the Allied Occupation of Japan lasted,
the Supreme Commander Allied Powers in the person of General
MacArthur (later General Ridgeway) was the ultimate authority
in Japan. This arrangement gave US military field commanders
freedom to operate without restriction by Japanese authorities.
These commanders, as well as top pentagon officials, were
even more reluctant to relinquish this freedom once the Korean
War began. As a result, the military was wary of giving up
21Emmerson, John K. , Arms, Yen & Power , p. 68, Dunellen, 1971
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the security of the Occupation for the uncertainty of the
return of sovereignty to Japan.
Dulles attempted to guarantee as much freedom of action
as possible for the US military in his negotiations. In the
first place, the treaties he negotiated applied only to the
main islands of Japan. This was the agreed term of the Potsdam
Declaration of 26 July 1945, which limited Japan to the four
main islands of Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu, and Hokkaido, to-
gether with certain adjacent islands. This meant that the
Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, including the important US bases
on Okinawa, would not be covered by the treaty. In fact these
islands were formally placed under the United Nations trustee-
ship system with the United States as sole administering
authority. The United States, under Article III of the Peace
Treaty had "...the right to exercise all and any powers of
administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory




Secondly, the US had the right, but not the obligation
to station troops in Japan under the Security Treaty. This
also gave more flexibility to US forces, as did the clause
permitting US forces to be used to "...contribute to the
22




maintenance of the international peace and security in the
23
Far East." Thus, US military forces were not limited to
protecting Japan, but could be used at the discretion of the
United States anywhere in the "Far East".
Finally, the Security Treaty required Japan to gain the
prior consent of the United States before granting any bases
or rights of maneuver or transit to military forces of any
other country. This clause also sought to assure the US
military that their preeminent position in Japan would not
be threatened by the ending of the Allied Occupation.
When Dean Acheson, then Undersecretary of State, announced
in May 1947 that in order to promote world recovery it was
necessary "to push ahead with the reconstruction of those two
great workshops of Europe and Asia—Germany and Japan," there
24
was wide disagreement among the allies concerning Japan. The
countries Dulles had the most difficulty convincing that Japan
should be accepted as a friend rather than punished as an enemy
were Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines. Leaders of these
countries felt that the future containment of Japan was as
important as the containment of the Soviet Union. As a result,
they were very concerned that the United States provide a brake
on Japanese military capability—especially long range naval
23
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The main concern of the Philippines, besides the contain-
ment of Japan was the question of reparations. Dulles was
quite adamant in his view that Japan should not be subjected
to a punitive peace treaty. To him the question of war
reparations should be taken up under separate bilateral agree-
26
ments and not be included in the peace treaty. Dulles, as
Dean Acheson later wrote, left the Philippines "simmering in
27
their dream of eight billion dollars in reparations."
All three of the former Pacific allies demanded, and
received security treaties with the United States as a quid
pro quo for agreeing to a non-punitive peace treaty with
Japan. Although there is some disagreement on this
28
interpretation it was no secret that the other nations of the
Pacific did not share American enthusiasm for a Japan without
war potential restrictions.
Treaties with these three countries solidified and extended
the US Pacific defense perimeter referred to by General
25
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MacArthur and Mr. Acheson. They all continue in force in
1977, and have played a role in defining US interests in the
region of the Pacific.
Neither the ANZUS or Philippine Treaties have had the
force, or needed it, that other US commitments have. Fears
of a revival of Japanese naval strength went unconfirmed and
none of the countries have been threatened since the treaties
were signed. Perhaps another reason for the US treaties with
Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines was a psychological
one. It seems likely that the United States wanted to express
a commitment at least as firm to its former allies as to its
former enemy.
Dulles was able to persuade the United States' Pacific
allies that Japan should be granted a non-punitive peace treaty
He pointed out to them that the United States could no longer
play the role of policeman in Japan, and it was much better
to have Japan as a future friend than a vanquished and
impoverished enemy.
The Japanese position was aided by the passage of time.
Had a peace treaty been signed shortly after the war when anti-
Japanese feelings ran strong among the allies, the terms of
peace would have undoubtedly been more strict. The growth of
the communist threat in Asia, especially the Korean War, also
aided the Japanese. Dulles told Prime Minister Yoshida that
the aim of the United States in the course of his negotiations




between victors and vanquished. In view of the earlier
treaty drafts prepared by the US State Department this would
not have been true had a treaty been signed in 1947.
The Japanese had consistently wished a treaty linked
with a security treaty since 1947. In 1951, although they
agreed that signing a peace treaty which did not include the
Soviet Union or China would leave problems for the future,
they were willing to sign one with as many nations as possible
The Japanese government also felt that Japan could handle
its own internal security if the United States could be per-
suaded to provide external security. Although Dulles pressed
Japan to develop a military force of some 350/000 men, Prime
Minister Yoshida resisted this both on economic and constitu-
tional grounds. He did not feel that the Japanese economy
could possibly support a force so large. (Japan's GNP in
FY51 was only $15 billion) . Article IX of the Japanese Con-
stitution prohibited "land, sea, and air forces, as well as
other war potential", and Article XVIII banned involuntary
military service. While Yoshida could agree to the National
Police Reserve established in July 1950, he did not feel that
it could be significantly increased beyond 125,000 men at that
time. He did, however, outline plans for a gradual increase
30
in size under a Ministry of Defense. This satisfied Dulles
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somewhat but there were still some legal problems.
The Vandenberg Senate Resolution of 1948 prohibited the
United States from forming definitive security arrangements
with other countries unless they were able to provide "con-
tinuous and effective self-help and mutual aid." Because
Japan had no military forces capable of this, the Security
Treaty had to be a provisional one based on the agreement that
Japan would "itself increasingly assume responsibility for
its own defense against direct and indirect aggression." The
Vandenberg Resolution also prevented the United States from
assuming an obligation to defend Japan, or to maintain forces
in Japan to guarantee its security and independence. The
US was instead granted the right to do so, but not the obligation
The United States was especially concerned about the
possibility of insurrection after the Occupation. As a result,
under the terms of the treaty, US forces could also be used:
"at the express request of the Japanese Government to
quell large scale internal riots and disturbances in
Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an
outside power or powers. "31
Dulles fully realized that the Japanese were buying
American security at the price of a portion of their sover-
eignty. He stated, however, that:
"Sovereignty which is not defensible is an empty husk.
Japan, disarmed physically, legally and psychologically,
is not now in a position to defend itself. Left alone,
31
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she would be surrounded and menaced by a Great Power of
demonstrated aggressiveness and she would not, in that
position be able to lead an independent existence. "32
Dulles also felt that the granting of US bases by Japan was
an important contribution to the security of the Far East and
Japan, but that this was a "small price for Japan to pay for
security worked out with a nation of her own choosing, which has
amply demonstrated respect for Japan's sovereignty and which,
33
to a unique degree, possesses power to deter aggression."
During 1950 and 1951 Dulles was able to gradually achieve
consensus among the four groups he had to deal with. He made
numerous trips abroad to negotiate with the main parties and
was able to arrive at terms which were satisfactory to them.
The British had been willing to compromise on the China issue;
Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines received assurances
that the United States would aid in providing security for
them; Japan regained its sovereignty and a security treaty;
the United States retained bases in and around Japan which
allowed it to maintain its military presence in East Asia.
Dulles negotiated four treaties during the fourteen-month
period he served as Special Ambassador. On August 30, 1951,
the US-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty was signed, and on
32
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September 1, 1951, the Australia-New Zealand-US CANZUS)
Security Treaty. Finally, on September 8, 1951. both the
Japanese Peace Treaty and the US-Japanese Security Treaty
were signed.
Although the Soviet Union, with the assistance of its
communist bloc allies attempted to obstruct the signing of
the Japanese Peace Treaty, Dulles and Acheson successfully
thwarted these attempts. Prime Minister Yoshida assured the
United States that his government intended to recognize Nation-
alist China. Yoshida 's move effectively quelled US Senate
opposition to the Peace and Security Treaties, and assured
their ratification on March 29, 1952. The Treaties became
effective on April 28, 1952, and on that day the Japanese
signed the promised Treaty of Peace with Nationalist China.
Throughout the period 1945-1951, the United States clearly
marked out its relationship with Japan as a vital interest
in East Asia. As hostilities between the US and USSR inten-
sified during the Cold War, the United States moved to define
more clearly its foreign policy goals in the Pacific. The
Korean War no doubt hastened US actions to redefine its
defense perimeter in that area; however, there seems to be
no doubt that the objective of preventing communist, Soviet
and/or Chinese hegemony never altered. The United States
did not come by its Asian-Pacific security commitments, es-
pecially the Japanese one, by default. The foreign policy
objective was clearly and deliberately pursued by actively
45

negotiating alliances in the area which would ensure that
United States security interests would be promoted.
46

III. PERIOD OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO JAPAN; 1950-1960
The Military Assistance Program CMAP) , or grant aid of
military equipment and training, began with the passage of the
Mutual Security Act of 1951, and continues to the present
day C19771. Under the terms of this law the United States
retains title to equipment and the recipient nation cannot
retransfer items to third party without the authorization
of the United States. Throughout the twenty-five years this
program was in effect, the United States transferred nearly
$38 billion worth of equipment. About $1 billion of this
34
went to Japan, or about 2.5% of the total amount.
Japan began receiving MAP aid officially in 1954, and
the program continued until 1967. The bulk of the aid, however,
had been given by 1959, and therafter dropped off rapidly.
CAid peaked at $131.5 million in 1959, was down to $34 million
by 1963, and was only $433 thousand in 1967). Although the
aid continued into the 1960s, its declining value after 1959
made the period between 1954 and 1960 most important. The
year 1960 also coincided with the revision of the Security
Treaty, and with it the rising importance of military sales
rather than military aid. By the time the treaty was revised,
Japan had received approximately 90% of the total MAP aid
granted under the program, and was already transitioning to a
34




military purchase program. The years 1957-1960 constituted
a period of transition from military aid to military sales.
The US-Japan Security Treaty of 1951 was never envisioned
as a permanent agreement. The preamble to the treaty states:
"Japan desires as a provisional arrangement for its
defense, that the United States of America should maintain
armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter
armed attack upon Japan."
The treaty stated, however that Japan was expected to:
"...increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense
against direct and indirect aggression. .. "35
The provisional nature of the agreement placed responsibility
upon Japan to build a military force capable of defense against
outside aggression, as well as internal disturbance.
In 1950, shortly after the outbreak of war in Korea,
General MacArthur authorized the formation of the National
Police Reserve. Initial size was set at 75,000 men and it was
primarily a home guard type of organization responsible for
maintaining internal security. Although mostly a ground force,
a small coastal patrol was also included.
By 1952, the force had grown to around 125,000 men and
was reorganized into the National Safety Force. The primary
mission remained internal security despite the reorganization.
The Coastal and Ground Safety Forces were a step toward assuming
more responsibility for defense, however, and Japan displayed
35
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willingness to expand the forces' capability. US Grant Aid
was one method Japan desired to further increase its defense
capability.
The writers of the Security Treaty realized that Japan was
not able to provide for its own defense at the time of
signing. Therefore, the US forces in Japan were to tempor-
arily provide for the "security of Japan against armed attack
36
from without." US forces could also be used for maintaining
internal security if called upon by the government of Japan.
In order to assist Japan in assuming the responsibility for
its own defense, the United States was prepared to grant
military assistance to Japan in the form of weapons, training
and equipment.
Before this aid could be given legally, however, Japan
had to comply with the terms of the Mutual Security Act of
1951 and the Vandenberg Resolution, which called on Japan to
pledge its own "continuous and effective self-help" in defending
the country from external attack. In addition, the Mutual
Defense Assistance Agreement of 1954 called upon Japan to:
"...fulfill the military obligations .. .assumed under
the Security Treaty. .. (and to) make, consistent with the
political and economic stability of Japan, the full con-
tribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities
and general economic conditions of the development and
maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive





measures which may be needed to develop its defense
capacities, and take appropriate steps to ensure the effec-
tive utilization of any assistance provided by the
Government of the United States of America." 3 '
In response to the obligation to provide measures for
external defense incurred under the Mutual Assistance Agreement,
Prime Minister Yoshida reorganized and expanded the Japanese
military forces. During the summer of 1954, debate over the
reorganization in the Japanese Diet was long and heated.
Many of the delegates feared that creation of the type of forces
required by the new agreement with the United States would
lead to a new rise of militarism; others felt that the econ-
omy of Japan could not support a military force of the size
and type envisioned. Communist delegates opposed the reorgan-
ization on the grounds that Japan was merely becoming a puppet
of US imperialism by establishing a military force supplied
by the Americans.
In spite of the opposition, two laws pertaining to the
reorganization were passed in July 1954. The first of them
was the Defense Agency Establishment Law. This law created
a Defense Agency and a Joint Staff Council under the command
of a civilian Director General. The Director was not given
cabinet rank, but worked under the Prime Minister. He did
however become a Minister of State without portfolio. The
37
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second law, the Self-Defense Forces Law, renamed the Ground
and Coastal Forces the Ground and Maritime Self-Defense Forces,
and added an Air Self Defense Force. The mission of the Forces,
according to the law, was "to defend Japan against direct and
indirect aggression, and when necessary, to maintain public
38
order." The total authorized strength of the forces was 152,110
men. Thus, for the first time since the end of World War II,
Japan was pledged to contribute to its own defense against
outside aggression. The provisions of the two laws passed in
1954 qualified Japan legally to receive US military aid.
Despite the lack of legal basis, the beginning of US
military aid was 1950, not 1954. Japan actually began receiving
military assistance with the inception of the National Police
Reserve in July 1950. According to the New York Times , 13 Nov
1952:
"Exact amounts and types of equipment given to
Japan since 1950 are 'top secret' and the authority
to turn over equipment is unclear since it has not
been open to Congressional approval. General Mark
W. Clark, Commander of the Far Eastern Command, will
only say that the Japanese have been given enough
equipment adequate for a light police type force.
The Far Eastern Command also refused to release any
figures on the dollar value of the arms equipment
given to Japan, but the total is known to run into
millions. "3 9
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The same Times article announced the signing of the Charter
Party Agreement, under which Japan was loaned 68 military ships.
The loan, which actually was approved by Congress on 8 July
1952, was comprised of 18 Patrol Frigates and 50 large landing
40
craft. Since Japan did not qualify for a comprehensive
program of military aid at that time, the deal was handled as
an executive agreement with both countries obtaining prior
Congressional approval. The arrangement was similar to the
World War II Lend Lease program with a term of five years and
an option to extend for an additional five years. According to
the Times , "At least some of the vessels were part of those
41
loaned to the Soviet Union during World War II." The first
of these ships was transferred to Japan on 14 January 1953,
and the transfer was completed by December of that year.
The Charter Party Agreement was by far the largest transfer
of military aid to Japan prior to 19 54. However, smaller
amounts of equipment had also been transferred. Although US
figures for the military aid given to Japan between 1950 and
1954 have never been declassified, Japanese sources set the
42
figure at $210.8 million for FY51-FY53.
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This period of time, of course , coincides with the Korean
War. The failure to declassify the material after such a long
time seems mysterious. However, according to Commerce Depart-
ment representatives, the figures were probably "misplaced or
destroyed during department moves" during the past twenty-five
years. Department of Defense officials were also unable to
provide figures for this period.
Of the $210.8 million noted by Japanese sources, Japan's
Ground Forces received $88.5 million worth of equipment,
including 244 tanks and 47 aircraft. Air Forces, which were
not formed until the reorganization of 1954, received none of
the aid. The remainder, including the vessels mentioned above,
43
went to the Maritime Forces.
Following the March 8th 1954 Mutual Defense Assistance
Agreement, the United States and Japan, on May 14th, signed an
additional vessel loan pact. Under the terms of this agreement
an additional 159 ships, with a total value of $80 million
were loaned to Japan. Over the following two decades the
document was in force, many of the vessels were eventually
declared excess stocks and were given to Japan as grant aid with
no return date stipulated.
Of the 159 ships, a total of 37 landing ships and 18 patrol
frigates were physically returned to the United States. Others,
including two destroyer escorts "returned" on 14 June 1975,
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ending the loan agreement, were merely transferred to grant
aid and remained in Japan. Thus, under the two vessel loan
agreements of 1952 and 1954, the United States loaned Japan
a total of 227 ships, and a total of 55 were physically
returned to the United States. This left 172 ships, 170 of
44
which were converted to grant aid. The remaining two ships
are not accounted for and presumably were either lost at sea
or scrapped.
In addition to the vessels, the Japanese Maritime Self
Defense Force also received a considerable amount of other
equipment as grant aid. Under the Military Assistance Program,
the naval forces received $263.8 million in aid. Of this
total, $54.5 million was made up of the vessels converted to
grant aid. It is significant that as late as 1967, over 40%
of the tonnage of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces
45
was made up of US owned ships. Since that time the percentage
has declined considerably as US ships were replaced by newer
Japanese owned ones. The Maritime Forces were also provided
with 217 aircraft under MAP. Naval aircraft in 1968 were also
40% US owned. Unlike the ship ownership situation, a significant
46
percentage of aircraft were still US owned in 1973.
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Military grant aid to Japan's Air Self Defense Force
totaled $4 22.3 million through the life of the MAP program.
This included 1248 aircraft. From the standpoint of defense
capability, the most significant items among the aircraft were
482 F-86s. The delivery of this type aircraft to Japan began
in FY55, and some are still in use today.
Grant aid to Japan's Ground Self Defense forces under the
Military Assistance Program was $168.8 million. Of this total,
226 tanks and 295 miscellaneous combat vehicles are included.
The number of tanks recorded by DOD figures differs signifi-
cantly from Japanese sources, which record 78 2 tanks for the
years 1951-1956 alone. For this same time period, Japan's
Ground Forces also received 179,000 metric tons of ammunition.
DOD figures for the entire period of military assistance
valued ammunition at slightly over $28 million. US sources
also list 339 large caliber guns and howitzers, 196 Nike
missiles, and 3 60 Hawk missiles which went to the Ground Forces
Also of importance during the period of US Military
Assistance Program aid to Japan were a total of nearly $175
47
million of excess defense articles. Specific items of
equipment are not listed; however, the excess defense articles
program consisted of equipment considered to no longer be of
use to the US military, and was transferred directly from a US
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with, the modest size of the National Police Reserve, over
2% of the GNP C$333 million) went to defense.
As Japan's economy began to recover in the early 1950s
(helped largely by orders from the US for equipment to support
troops in Korea), Japan's expenditures for defense also
increased. By 1960, Japan's GNP climbed to $35.4 billion, and
the defense budget rose to $43 6 million. The percent of
GNP going to defense decreased to 1.23% and the percent of the
total government budget allocated to defense declined from
49
18.23% to 10%. The trend of rapidly increasing GNP, and
moderately increasing defense expenditures has been a
consistent one. As a result, although total defense expenditures
have increased each year, the percentage of GNP to defense and
percentage of the national budget to defense, have consistently
declined.
During this period of time the size of US forces in Japan
gradually declined as the size of the Self Defense Forces
increased. From the initial 75,000 man Japanese force of 1950,
the Self Defense Forces incrementally increased in size to
206,000 by 1960. US Forces declined from 260,000 to 47,000
during the same period of time. The combined strength of the
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two forces declined from around 350,000 in 1954 to 250,000 by 1960.
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The combination of US aid and increasing defense
expenditures by Japan gave the Self Defense Forces a much
greater capability in 1960 than the original National Police
Reserve of 1950. However, estimates of actual ability to
withstand attack vary widely. Even though equipment was more
modern, stockpiles of ammunition remained extremely small.
In the face of a conventional attack on Japan, the Self Defense
Forces would only have been able to hold out for a matter of a
51
few days before running out of ammunition. This indicated
that Japan still depended on the United States as the primary
defense against external attack.
Recalling the terms of the 1951 Security Treaty and the
position of Prime Minister Yoshida during negotiations of that
arrangement, the primary function of the SDF in 1960 was still
to provide internal security. On the surface, it looked as
though the SDF was gradually being strengthened to replace
departing US troops. However, if ammunition stockpile estimates
were correct, it indicated that the combined defense strength
of the SDF and US Forces Japan actually decreased considerably
as a result of the US reduction of forces in Japan. Although
not stated publicly, reduction of tensions in East Asia may
have caused the two governments to feel capabilities could be
safely reduced while still maintaining the effectiveness of the
alliance.
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The regional political situation in East Asia changed
significantly during the 1950s. Although Foreign Minister
Shigemitsu stated in 1956, that he "could see no situation
developing which would lead Japan ever again to play an active
role in the world arena," forces were already in motion which
would make this statement unrealistic. He saw Japan as a
52
passive state, acted upon by others, but not acting upon others.
This attitude, conditioned by the Occupation, had already shown
signs of changing by 1954.
The Democratic Party of Japan, formed in October of 1954
in the wake of scandal in the Yoshida government, had selected
Ichiroo Hatoyama as its leader. With the aid of the Socialists,
Hatoyama was elected premier and took office on December 7,
1954. Immediately after being elected, Hatoyama declared that
normalization of relations with the Soviet Union and Communist
China were his central policy goals and this quickly became the
slogan of the Democratic Party. Since Prime Minister Yoshida
had done little but extend US occupation policies, this marked
the first independent foreign policy move by Japan since World
War II. Hatoyama, in opposition to Shigemitsu, also advocated
revision of Article IX to allow Japan to rebuild its military
forces.
The fear that communism, in the form of the Chinese-Soviet
monolith, was determined to sweep through Asia had influenced
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Dulles heavily during the security treaty negotiations.
Penetrations of Japan's airspace by Soviet MIG fighters
during the Korean War, and the possibility of a communist
inspired insurrection in Japan were important factors during
the negotiations. These themes were shared by the Yoshida
government and largely provided the basis for the security
treaty and Japan's foreign policy with regard to its communist
neighbors.
In part, because of the effectiveness of the US efforts
to prevent the Soviet Union from playing any effective role
in the Occupation of Japan, the post-Occupation relations of
Japan and the Soviet Union were formed by the United States.
No contact was made with the Japanese government by the Soviet
Union during the Occupation, and political influence was sought
only among the "people" through the support of left-wing groups
in Japan. Japan's communists in 194 9, advocated revolution by
force. They staged what was called a "rally for the rising of
the people" at the Imperial Palace in Tokyo. Several of the US
Occupation troops were injured at the rally and both Yoshida and
General MacArthur were seriously alarmed at the prospects cf a
Soviet sponsored uprising. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship
and Alliance was specifically aimed at Japan and the United States
In addition, Soviet demands for the neutralization of Japan and
recognition of Communist China at the San Francisco Peace Confe-
rence set the tone of post-War Japan-USSR relations.
The change in Soviet policy towards Japan did not occur
until 1954, after the death of Stalin. On September 12, 1954,
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the Soviet Union announced that it was ready to normalize
relations with Japan. There followed nearly two years of
negotiations between the two countries during which there
were many false starts and interruptions. In the end, all
issues except the return of Japanese territory seized by the
USSR in the waning days of World War II were settled. Diplo-
matic and economic relations were normalized and the state
of war between the two countries was terminated. The Soviet
Union agreed to support Japan's application for membership in
the United Nations, which it did on December 12, 1956. Further-
more, the two countries agreed to settle all disputes peace-
fully and to refrain from interference in each others ' inter-
nal affairs. Finally, the Soviet Union recognized Japan's
right to individual and collective self defense. Despite
the Joint Declaration of 19 October 1956, however, no formal
treaty of peace was signed, and the question of occupied
territory has never been resolved.
Internationally, the mid-1950s was a time of thaw in the
global Cold War with the impact of the Soviet policy of "peace-
ful coexistence" especially evident in East Asia. It was most
prominently manifested at the Geneva Conference of 1954 which
temporarily halted the war in Indo-China, and at the Afro-
Asian Bandung Conference, which condemned bipolar confronta-
tion and apparently launched the Third World as a new force
in world politics. This was also the period when Japan, under
Hatoyama moved toward a wider and more independent international
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role. In addition to the effort toward reconciliation with,
the Soviet Union, increased contact with Communist China and
the settlement of war reparations with the Philippines figured
prominently in Japanese foreign policy during the mid-1950s.
Thus, while the US and Japan gradually strengthened the military
capability of Japan, the Japanese, under new leadership simul-
taneously began to move back into the international arena
of world politics.
During the period of the 1950s, Japan gained a new sense
of self-confidence. Its economy began to recover from the
war, as evidenced by the growth of its GNP;the military was
gradually restructured and slowly rebuilt; Japan began to
venture out into world politics again and gained UN membership;
and the terms of the Sino-Japanese normalization included the
recognition of the US-Japanese Security Treaty.
Although Hatoyama was successful in reaching agreement
with the Soviet Union to end the state of hostilities that
had existed since 1945, the forces of internal political
differences forced him to resign when the agreement was com-
pleted. Even though Yoshida had been out of office for two
years, the sharply divergent tack of Hatoyama 's foreign policy
faced strong opposition from the Yoshida followers. In spite
of the fact that the agreement with the Soviet Union was tied
to Soviet acceptance of the US-Japan Security Treaty, the
shift was radical enough for the Diet opposition forces to
make political capital. As a result, Hatoyama announced his
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retirement intentions on 10 August 19 56. This led to an
intensified battle by the opposition to discredit him through
criticism of the Soviet negotiations. During the final months
of 1956, while the negotiations took a turn for the worse,
53
chaos reigned the the Diet.
In December 1956, Tanzan Ishibashi took over as Prime
Minister of Japan. Ishibashi was a supporter of the normal-
ization of relations with Japan's communist neighbors, and
felt that with the Soviet problem "solved", the next move
should be to negotiate an agreement with Communist China.
Despite the fierce opposition in the Diet that had accompanied
the Soviet negotiations, there was a general feeling of optim-
ism and independence in Japan. The departure from the Yoshida
foreign policy, so closely connected with the United States,
combined with the Soviet agreement and UN membership to give
the Japanese a feeling of acceptance and self-confidence.
Normalization of relations with China was a natural extension
of the movement to re-enter world politics as an independent
nation.
China had been carrying out an effective campaign since
1954 aimed at closer Sino-Japanese relations. The great
potential for trade with the Chinese, the often expressed
Japanese attitude of cultural affinity with China, and the
effective propaganda effort of China combined to provide
53




important impetus to re-establishment of normal relations.
By 1956, Japanese exports to mainland China exceeded those to
Taiwan in value, and Ishibashi found considerable support
for opening negotiations.
Normalization was not to come, however. Ishibashi 's
age and health forced him to resign before negotiations could
begin. At the age of seventy-two, and after only two months
in office, he was forced to resign. Normalization of relations
with the Peoples" Republic of China did not take place for
another fifteen years following the Nixon trip to China.
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IV. PHASING OUT MILITARY ASSISTANCE : 1957-1960
When. Nobusuke Kishi took office on 21 Feb 1957
,
it
appeared that the trend begun by Hatoyama and Ishibashi
would be continued. In his first news conference, Kishi
stated that he favored increased trade with Communist China
and that, "from the point of view of national sentiment,
the Japanese people desire that the present security treaty
and administrative agreement between Japan and the United
54
States should be abolished."
Japan's growing sense of pride plus the increasing
unpopularity of US bases in Japan resulted in pressures for
Japan to accelerate the trend towards more independent foreign
policies. Kishi felt that the solution to these pressures was
to press for a revision of the Security Treaty. As early as
1955, he had accompanied Foreign Minister Shigemitsu on a trip
to the United States during which revision was discussed. The
joint communique which was released at the end of that visit
stated:
"...efforts should be made... such that Japan could...
assume primary responsibility for the defense of its
homeland. . .when such conditions were brought about it
would be appropriate to replace the present security
treaty with one of greater mutuality . "55
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By the Spring of 1957, as Kishi planned a visit to the
United States, he was well aware of growing public sentiment
for revision of the treaty. Numerous public opinion polls
taken during 19 57 showed that the Japanese public was anxious
for revision and the withdrawal of US troops. He proceeded
cautiously with his plan to revise the treaty as he prepared
for the US visit. Not wanting to promise too much to his
people and then return empty-handed, he made no definitive
statements prior to the visit. He placed the China normalization
problem in the background by tying revision to increased ties
with the PRC in the public mind, and made it clear that the
first step to a more independent foreign policy was revision
of the treaty.
During the same period of time, Japanese opinions on the
major objections to the 1951 treaty were formulated. These were:
CD The treaty was one-sided and unequal. The United
States had the right to station troops in Japan, but there was
no specific obligation for the US to defend Japan.
C2) There was no time limit specified.
C3) The possible use of US troops for internal riot
control.
(4) There were no restrictions on the use of US
troops from Japan in other areas of the Far East. Thus, Japan
might be dragged into war against her will.
(5) There was no restriction on equipping US troops in
Japan with nuclear weapons.
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C6) There was no obligation for the US to abide
by the UN charter in the treaty.
The major objections became Kishi's goals in revising
the Security Treaty. Ee was aware, however, that in order
to obtain US agreement, he would have to make preparations for
Japan to assume a larger share of the burden of its defense.
The 1955 joint statement of Shigemitsu and Dulles made it plain
that the United States considered the buildup of Japanese
forces a necessary step in revision. In preparation for this
Kishi had the First Defense Buildup Program drawn up.
On May 20, 1957, The Basic National Defense Policy was
approved by the cabinet, and on June 14, 19 57, it also approved
the First Defense Buildup Program. The plan was vague and set
no specific goals of the buildup, only saying that the program
was decided:
"With a view to the buildup of the minimum require-
ment of a self-defense potential in accordance with the
Basic National Defense Policy and in keeping with
national resources and conditions . "56
Apparently, this was enough to satisfy the United States.
In a joint statement issued at the end of Kishi's US visit on
July 8, 19 57, President Eisenhower said:
"The United States welcomes Japan's plans for the
buildup of her defense forces and accordingly, in
consonance with the letter and the spirit of the
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Security Treaty, will substantially reduce the
numbers of United States forces in Japan within
the next year, including a prompt withdrawal of
all United States ground combat forces. The United
States plans still further reductions as the
Japanese defense forces grow. "57
The communique also called for the establishment of a joint
committee to consider future adjustments in the relationships
between the two countries.
Although Kishi returned to Japan with the diplomatic
triumph he had sought, it was a year before Foreign Minister
Fujiyama, on July 9, 1958, proposed to Ambassador MacArthur
that talks be opened. The United States replied with three
options:
CD A simple base lease agreement.
C2) Rewording of the old treaty.
C3) A new treaty.
Kishi, over foreign office objections, replied on August 25,
that Japan desired a new treaty. The United States agreed and
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negotiations were opened on October 4, 1958.
The revised treaty was finally signed on January 19, 1960,
after prolonged negotiations and domestic political turmoil.
During that time, relations with Communist China and the
Soviet Union deteriorated. On 19 November 1958, PRC Foreign
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Minister, Ch'en Yi, in a note to Kishi, accused him of
plotting against the PRC and warned him to come to his senses
59
or face disaster. Chou En-lai stated to visiting Japanese
correspondents on July 25, 1957, that:
"We have no objection to Japan's friendship
with the United States, but the point is Kishi went to
the United States to curry favor from his American
masters by slinging mud at the new China. "60
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, in a note to the
Japanese Ambassador to the Soviet Union, said:
"Is it not clear to everyone today that in
conditions of a modern rocket-nuclear war all Japan
with her small and thickly populated territory,
dotted moreover with foreign war bases, risks
sharing the tragic fate of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in
the very first minutes of hostilities?"^!
In December 1958, the Soviets urged Japan to adopt neutrality
and in return they would guarantee such neutrality by creating
a "nuclear free zone" in East Asia.
Apparently, both the Soviets and the Chinese saw the
political dissension in Japan during the negotiations as an
opportunity to break Japan away from a treaty with the United
States altogether. Despite the combination of internal and
external political tensions, which resulted in widespread rioting
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as the treaty came up for ratification in I960, the treaty
was approved by the Diet and the US Senate, and ratifications
were exchanged at Tokyo on June 23, 1960.
Although Kishi was forced to resign as a result of the
widespread dissension caused by the treaty revision, the cast
of US-Japanese security relations had been made by the
ratification of the revised treaty. Virtually all goals of
the Japanese government sought during the negotiations were
embodied in the new treaty. The United States agreed that an
attack on either party in Japanese administered territory would
be dangerous to the peace and security of both parties, and
would act in accordance with constitutional provisions and
processes to meet such an attack. A time limit of ten years
was set by the treaty with automatic annual renewal unless one
of the parties indicated otherwise. The clause allowing the
use of US troops for internal riot control was dropped in the
new treaty. Japan was given the right of prior approval before
US troops could be used in areas outside the territory of Japan
Japan also gained the right to approve major changes in deploy-
ment of US forces and their equipment. This meant that the
deployment of nuclear weapons, could, and has been regulated by
the Japanese. Under the so-called three non-nuclear principles
the Japanese government has stated that the manufacture,
possession, and deployment of nuclear weapons is prohibited.
Finally, the treaty stated that nothing inconsistent with the




One of the most important clauses in the new treaty was
Article III. This stated that:
"The Parties individually and in cooperation
with each other, by means of continuous and
effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain
and develop, subject to their constitutional 62
provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack."
The original security arrangement met the goals of both
parties for a number of years. However, with the recovery
of Japan during the 19 50s, a new treaty which gave Japan more
equality was proper. With increasing equality and responsibility,
Japan assumed the burden for providing more of its own defense.
The inception of the first defense buildup plan was an
indication of Japan's willingness to accept a greater role in
defense.
Chart 3 of the Appendix shows graphically the transition
from Grant Aid to Sales. Aid, which peaked in 1959, declined
rapidly thereafter. US government Foreign Military Sales
(FMS) combined with commercial sales contracts climbed rapidly
and surpassed MAP in FY63. Thus, as the roles of the two
countries altered with the revision of the security treaty, Japan
began to steadily increase arms expenditures as grant aid
declined.
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V. PERIOD OF FMS AND COMMERCIAL SALES ; I96 0- 19 7
5
United States sales, of aims to other countries, including
those to Japan, are made under two categories: Foreign Military
Sales (FMS), and commercial sales. Foreign Military Sales
are completed on a government to government basis with US
agencies completing much of the transaction. Once the sale
is approved by the various agencies and the method of payment
(.credit or cash) is agreed upon, the items are shipped to the
recipient. In the case of commercial sales, US government
agencies play a lesser role. Although the government still
controls the types and amounts of equipment that can be sold to
other countries through the granting of export licenses, most
of the price and type of payment negotiations are conducted by
the company making the sale. In both cases, FMS and commercial
sales, the US Congress must approve all transactions in excess
of $25 million. Since the purpose is to show the trend from
grant aid to sales, the sales procedure is of little consequence;
the important criteria is whether the equipment was given as aid,
or paid for by the recipient.
Grant aid military transfers built up rapidly annually until
the mid-1950s. Following that time grants leveled off and began
a gradual decline in total value through the 1960s and 1970s.
From a low of around $56 million in 1950, grant aid peaked at
$2.3 billion in 1958, and declined to $766 million by 1975.
In contrast to this annual sales of equipment to other countries




$4 billion by 1975. Sales and grant aid totals are in
terms of actual deliveries rather than orders, and are
conservative in relation to non-government estimates. For
example, the New York Times , on 14 April 1975, estimated total
US transfers for FY 75 at $10.3 billion, with $8.3 billion
of this FMS and the remaining $2 billion aid and commercial sales
This general trend to more sales and fewer grants has also
been the pattern for US transfers to Japan. As mentioned
earlier, a portion of the reason for this was the increasing
ability of Japan to pay cash for military equipment, as well
as the desire for greater independence in foreign policy.
At the same time, the United States showed a greater reluctance
to give grant aid to countries who could afford to pay for the
equipment. This trend probably would have taken place even if
the Security Treaty had not been revised. However, the trend
was accelerated by the changing nature of the US-Japanese
security arrangement. In the cases of other US allies in the
area such as Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines, all were
still receiving substantial amounts of US aid in FY7 5.
($8, $137.5, and $14.9 million respectively). Purchases by
Japan from 1950-1975 exceeded the total purchases of all three
of these countries combined. Therefore, even though the pattern
of Japan follows that of US transfers worldwide, it has been an
accelerated one in relation to other US allies in the area.
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Foreign Military Sales to Japan began in FY56. Total
amounts transferred during the first four years were relatively
small, averaging only about one and a half million dollars
per year. In 1960, however, coinciding with the revision
of the security treaty, the annual amount jumped to nearly
$9.5 million. The annual amount between FY6 and FY7 5 varied
between $9 and $42 million with FY68 and FY7 2 the peak years.
Items of Foreign Military Sales to Japan indicate that the
major objective was to improve air defenses. Although the
Ground Self Defense Forces received the bulk of the equipment
C$161 million) , most of this went to ground to air missile
systems. The only non-air defense major weapons sold to the
Ground Forces under the FMS program were thirty 105mm howitzers
and seven 155mm howitzers. In contrast to this the Ground
Forces received 152 Nike and 181 Hawk ground to air missiles.
According to DOD sources purchases for the Air Self Defense
Forces under FMS totalled $92 million. However, only fourteen
aircraft are enumerated, twelve C-46s and two SH-34 helicopters.
The total delivery cost of the airplanes alone was $85.6 million.
This seems an unlikely figure for such a small number of aircraft
Japanese government figures for the same period list a total of
105 aircraft, with 35 of these going to the Air Forces. This
includes fourteen RF4, seven C-46, and fourteen T-34 aircraft.
Other aircraft purchases which went to Ground and Maritime
Forces are thirty-four helicopters, twenty-nine B-6 5, two T-34,
and five TC-90 aircraft. The Air Defense Forces also received
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nearly 160Q air to air missiles, mostly Sidewinder infrared
64
and Sparrow radar types.
Maritime Defense Forces purchased $97 million worth of
equipment under the FMS program. Only six ships, three each,
of the Landing Craft and Landing Ship variety are listed in
DOD figures, with a total value of $7.7 million. This leaves
nearly $9Q million unaccounted for in both the US and Japanese
governments' figures. A portion of this, of course, is the
aircraft previously mentioned which went to Maritime Forces.
Other major items, however, are unavailable for listing.
Figures concerning US commercial sales and licensing
agreements are not as complete as those for FMS. DOD sources
only list the total dollar amounts from its inception in FY6 0,
through FY74. No unclassified breakdown by service branch or
major types of equipment is available. Although the information
is sketchy, the annual totals shown in Table 5 of the Appendix
are useful in comparing Japan's commercial purchases to those
of other US allies in the Asian-Pacific area.
Japan accounted for over 10% of US total commercial arms
sales from FY60 to FY74. Japan's cash commercial purchases
exceeded the total of all other East Asia allies combined. The
grand total of $4 95 million in commercial purchases by Japan
represents a very small portion of total Japanese military
procurement. The entire commercial sales amount is less than
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one third of the military procurement for FY74 alone.
Licensing agreements between the US and Japan are even
more difficult to analyze. The US goal when approving a
license for the manufacture of equipment by Japan is to obtain
50% of the dollars it would have cost Japan to buy a weapon
outright. For example, if a US airplane costs $4 million to
buy outright, the United States requires that half of that, or
$2 million worth be manufactured in the United States. Even
though it costs Japan more than $4 million to manufacture rather
than buy outright, the US still requires 50% of the $4 million
65
price made in USA.
Japan's goal in negotiating a licensing agreement is to
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have 85% of all items actually made in Japan. This would mean
that $2 million required by the United States would represent
only 15% of the total cost to Japan if both parties satisfy their
requirements. This would increase the price of the $4 million
dollar airplane to nearly $27 million. Although Japan is willing
to pay a higher price for equipment that is manufactured
domestically under license, they would not be willing to pay nearly
seven times the outright purchase cost.
What results is a complicated arrangement of the licensing
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contract with a sliding ratio of US versus Japanese manufacture.
For example, in a contract for 100 airplanes under a licensing
agreement, the first group might be wholly made in the US. The
second group might be pre-fabricated in the US and assembled
in Japan. A third group might be 50% US made, a fourth 75%
Japanese made, and the fifth 100% Japanese manufactured. The
cost to Japan would also slide with the change in percentages.
The first group being purchased outright and the United States
progressively receiving less cash through the life of the
contract.
Based on the outright purchase price of $4 million, the
United States would receive $200 million for the 100 airplanes
throughout the contract, but the amount per aircraft would be
constantly decreasing. Even though the price per airplane would
be about three times more than the outright purchase price of
$4 million because of expenses of setting up manufacturing
facilities, the Japanese goal of 85% manufactured in Japan
would be met. The price per airplane is higher but this method
saves foreign exchange and provides jobs, expertise, and
permanent domestic manufacturing capability. Rather than paying
out $400 million in foreign exchange for the 100 airplanes, the
Japanese pay only half that amount while avoiding much of the
very high cost of research and development it would take to turn
out a totally domestically designed and built airplane. As a
bonus, manufacturing techniques and technology which can be
applied to other items is gained at relatively low cost. The
United States also gains foreign exchange from the arrangement
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which adds to a favorable overall balance of payments with
Japan.
A further complication in attempting to analyze sales
under licensing agreements is that all items included in a
contract are considered to be built in Japan. Even though,
as the above example shows, a portion of the total number
ordered are actually wholly or partially made in the United
States, the entire number is listed as made in Japan. Of the
total aircraft procured by Japan through 197 5, 1,433 were
supposedly made in Japan, and only 105 purchased outright.
Nearly all of the military aircraft made in Japan are of US
design and were made under licensing agreements. None of these
airplanes are included in US or Japanese figures of sales to
Japan. Because of the complicated nature of licensing contracts,
a breakout of US sales under this type of agreement is impossible
without a detailed analysis of all the contracts. The figure
would be large, however, even for only the fighter aircraft.
Using purchase prices of $4 million for the 69 F4 aircraft, $1.2
million for the 197 F104 aircraft, and $500 thousand for the 205
F-86 aircraft made in Japan yields a figure of $615 million. If
the US goal of receiving 50% of outright purchase price was
obtained, this would mean $307.5 million which was not listed as
sales to Japan. Total unaccounted sales would probably exceed
$1 billion if it were possible to separate percentages of all
aircraft actually sold to Japan under the license agreements.
The accounting practice does not indicate that there has been any
attempt to hide sales of aircraft or other equipment under
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licensing agreements. It does, however, make it very difficult
without access to contract terms to obtain a true picture of
amounts of equipment sold to Japan.
Table 6 of the Appendix is a summary of all types and
amounts of arms transactions between the United States and its
allies in the Asian-Pacific area. Total Japanese procurement
from the United States (its only foreign supplier) was $2.1
billion between 1950 and 1975. The percentage of grants and
purchases is roughly equal, and as noted earlier the bulk of
grant aid was received between 1950 and 1960. Total Japanese
procurement of military equipment in the post war period was
67
$9.1 billion. Of the $7 billion made in Japan, some
percentage was actually produced in the United States under the
licensing agreements discussed above.
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VI. JAPAN'S CONTRIBUTION TO DEFENSE
In July 1956, the National Defense Council was created.
This group was instituted to formulate overall national defense
policies and goals. Among the responsibilities of the council,
one of the most important was the planning of force levels and
equipment requirements of the Self Defense Forces. It was also
responsible for the formulation of the "Basic Policies of
National Defense" at the direction of Prime Minister Kishi in
May 1957. This document still provides the basis for Japanese
defense plans and policies. The basic policies embrace the
following four points:
CD Support of United Nations activities, international
harmony, and the realization of world peace.
C2) Stability of national life, promotion of patriotism,
establishment of foundations for national security.
C3) Gradual build-up of effective defense power within
the limit of need of self-defense according to the national
strength and conditions.
(4) Preparedness to deal with aggression from outside,
on the basis of mutual security accords with the United States
until the time when the UN would become ready to stop
68
aggression.
In conjunction with the statement of basic policies, the
National Defense Council, in June 1957, outlined the goals of the
68
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defense force buildup which covered the years 1958 through
1960. These goals, which later became known as the "First
Defense Buildup Program," included six regional divisions,
four mixed brigades and 18 0,000 men for the Ground Self Defense
Forces. The Maritime Self Defense Force goal was 124,000 tons
of vessels and 200 airplanes, and the Air Self Defense Force
was to have 33 air units and about 13 00 airplanes. Because of
longer construction time periods, the Air and Maritime levels
69
were extended to the end of FY62.
This first program was part of the overall strategy to
induce the United States to revise the security treaty, and was
a modest beginning to buildup Japan's Self Defense Forces.
Ground Forces were built up to replace departing US ground combat
troops which were withdrawn under the joint agreement between
Prime Minister Kishi and President Eisenhower of July 1957.
Even before this agreement, US troop strength had declined
significantly after the Korean War. In 1952 there were 260,000
US military men stationed in Japan. By the end of 1956, this
number had declined to only 117,000. During 1957 an additional
30,000 were withdrawn, and by the end of the First Defense Plan
in 1960, there were only 47,000 US troops stationed in Japan.
These figures do not include US troops stationed in Okinawa,
which did not revert to Japan until 1972. By 1976, total US
69
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troops in Japan and Okinawa were reduced to 5Q,0QQ with two
7Q
thirds of them in Okinawa.
While US troops were departing, the Self Defense Forces
grew in size. From the original 75,000 man National Police
Reserve of 1950, the Self Defense Forces, by 1960, had a total
authorized size of 230,935. Although authorized troop strengths
have never been attained, by 1956, there were actually 188,000
men in the SDF. This increased to 211,0 00 by the end of 1957
and 215,000 by the end of 1959. In 1960, however, possibly as
a result of the adverse conditions accompanying the revision of
the Security Treaty, actual troop strength declined to 206,000.
By 1976, there were about 250,000 men in the Self Defense Forces.
The turmoil of the Security Treaty revision in 1960 also delayed
the beginning of the Second Defense Plan until 1962.
In July 1961 the National Defense Council announced the
Second Defense Force Buildup Program. This plan differed from the
first one in the realization that Japanese forces had to assume
more of the functions formerly performed by US forces. Actual
strength in terms of men and amounts of equipment changed only
slightly. However, there was an increase in capability due to
more sophisticated equipment. Ground Forces authorized troop
strength remained at 18 0,000; however, 30,000 reserves were added.
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The Maritime Forces increased tonnage to about 14 0,000 and
the Air Forces decreased to about 1,000 airplances. The Air
Forces began to receive F104 fighters to replace older F8 6
models, and Japan received four ground to air missile units
complete with a BADGE radar system.
While the First and Second Buildup Programs depended
heavily on US assistance on the basis of the Mutual Security
Act, in the Third Buildup Program it became imperative to
pursue a direction of greater self-effort because of anti-US
feeling in Japan and criticism raised in the United States.
Under the Third Defense Buildup Program, approved by the Na-
tional Defense Council in November 1966, several major programs
were begun. The stated goal was " to buildup effective power
that is to most efficiently cope with localized wars or wars
71
below such level with conventional weapons."
The Maritime Defense Force received about 48,000 tons of
new ships under the Third Program. This amounted to 56 vessels,
including one equipped with "Tartar" ship to ship missiles.
Other vessels were fourteen escort ships, including two heli-
copter carriers and five submarines. The Maritime Forces
also received 60 fixed wing anti-submarine aircraft and 33
anti-submarine helicopters.
Air defense capability was augmented with two units each
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of Hawk, and Nike-Hercules ground to air guided missiles.
Selection of the F4 as the new first line fighter aircraft and
beginning deployment also took place under the Third Program.
The Ground Defense Forces were expanded slightly with an
increase of 8,500 men. New equipment for the Ground Forces
included 83 large and medium helicopters, about 160 armored
vehicles, 10 transport planes, and replacement of about 280
tanks
.
In October 1970, Director General Nakasone of the Defense
Agency published Japan's first "White Paper on Defense".
He advocated buildup of an "independent force" or "autonomous
defense capability" for the Self Defense Forces. The use of
these terms in defining the purpose of the Self Defense Forces
caused quite a stir both in Japan and abroad. The basic
positions contained in the White Paper were:
CD All strategies were "exclusively for defense".
(2) Japan would take a position of "independent" or
"autonomous" defense, with the Japan-US Security Treaty in
a supplementary relationship.
(3) Japan would formulate a concept of a "non-nuclear,
medium sized nation" with corresponding defense responsibil-
ities .
These concepts in themselves were not radical departures from
former Japanese policies. However, one section which aroused




"It is possible for Japan from a legal point of view
to possess small nuclear weapons if they are within the
framework of minimum necessity for self defense and if
they do not pose a threat of aggression to other countries. 72
This passage was interpreted as indicating that the gate to
nuclear armament had been opened, thus rekindling fears that
Japan was embarked on the road to the revival of militarism.
It should be pointed out, however, that Japan shows little
indication of developing nuclear weapons. Although the country
has an extensive nuclear electricity generating program, there
has been no move to convert this to a nuclear weapons industry.
Japan has kept the nuclear option open and is capable of
producing nuclear warheads in a short period of time. It has
signed, but not ratified, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
and is currently building a fast breeder reactor capable of
producing plutonium which could be used in warheads. There is
no need for Japan to develop nuclear weapons as long as the
US nuclear guarantee is reliable and desirable. It would be
nearly impossible for the government to overcome domestic
opposition to nuclear weapons unless a crisis should arise.
In the meantime, Japan's capability to become a nuclear power
must be considered by other nations.
The Defense Agency, in April 1971, released its own
draft plan for the Fourth Defense Buildup Program. This called
for total appropriations of about $18 billion or nearly double
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the Third Program, and added further to the fears of military
expansion. Nakasone subsequently left the Defense Agency,
and by the time the National Defense Council announced the
official Fourth Defense Program in February 1972, appropria-
tions had been cut to about $15 billion.
Under the Fourth Defense Buildup Program CFY72-FY76)
the Ground Self Defense Forces were to receive 28 tanks
Cof which 160 are new models) . In addition, 17 armored
vehicles (136 new models) , 90 automatic mobile cannons, 90
self-propelled artillery, 159 tactical aircraft (154 heli-
copters) , as well as augmentation of three units of Hawk
missiles were to be added.
The Maritime Self Defense Force was authorized 13 escort
ships, icluding two equipped with helicopters and one with
ship to ship missiles. In the total of 54 ships to be received
were five submarines and one supply ship. In addition 92
aircraft, including 87 anti-submarine type were ordered.
Air Self Defense Forces were to augment two units of Nike
ground to air missiles and make preparations to add another
unit. They also ordered 46 F4 fighters, 14 RF4 reconnaissance
planes, 59 T2 trainers, 68 FST2 support planes, and 24 CI
transport aircraft.
The Fourth Program, with all its controversy, ended up
being little more than a modest continuation of the Third
Program. Soaring inflation during the period of the Fourth
Program caused some delays and cutbacks in the equipment
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authorized, and forced Japan to alter buildup goals somewhat.
An emphasis on quality rather than quantity developed as the
government sought ways to reduce expenditures with a minimum
effect on the capabilities of the Self Defense Forces.
According to figures provided by the Japanese Embassy,
the Ground Self Defense Forces will be authorized 180,000
men on active duty and 3 9,0 00 reservists by the end of the
Fourth Program. These will be divided into five armies con-
sisting of thirteen divisions and eight Hawk missile groups.
The Maritime Forces will total 168,000 tons of ships and about
290 aircraft, mostly anti-submarine type. The Air Forces
will have about 920 aircraft in sixteen squadrons, twenty-
eight radar sites and five groups of Nike missiles. Most of
the equipment in all three branches is fairly new and relatively
sophisticated. Although small in relation to what could be
supported by Japan's economy, it is unlikely that the com-
position or size will be altered in the foreseeable future.
Near the end of the Fourth Program, Japan began to alter
the concept and direction for future acquisition of equipment.
For the first time, Japan appeared to feel that merely con-
tinuing with a fifth, sixth, seventh buildup plan without
setting an absolute limit on expansion was not desirable.
Prior to this, little thought was given to setting ultimate
goals of force levels and equipment. Director General Sakata
in a speech to the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan in
March 1976, outlined his plans for the post-Fourth Defense
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Buildup Program. His concept is to set limits on peacetime
standing defense capabilities and thereby prevent public
apprehension that the buildup might continue on an open-ended
basis. He also stated, however, that:
"My idea was also to make it clear on the other hand,
that such a capability will be flexible enough to be ex-
panded, if tension mounts or a crisis is imminent, to the
counter-contingency capability within a relatively short
warning time . " '
^
Sakata went on to say that he planned to streamline
various elements of the Self Defense Forces, and that priority
was on quality rather than quantity.
"In practice," he said, " higher priorities will go to
(a) manpower education and training
(b) patrol and warning functions, and
(c) intelligence and communications systems.
These will be strengthened even beyond the level of the stand-
ing defense capability if necessary, so that they could
always be ready to meet any contingency . "74
The motives for Sakata ' s concept for defense buildup in the
future reflect several conditions which have become evident
in the past few years. In his opinion, the concept reflects:
"(a) Our reponse to an economic, financial restriction
imposed on defense in this transition period from high to
stable economic growth.
(b) Our strategic-political assessment that the climate
of detente will remain basically unchanged, although certain
risks might confront general international relations.
(c) Above all, most importantly our own political judgment
73
Sakata, Michita, untitled speech to Foreign Correspondents







or rather my own political judgment that now is the time
for establishing a guideline for the standing defense
capability in peace time, if we are to gradually build up
our defense capability for our self defense without unnec-
essarily threatening our neighbors or without demanding
excessively larger shares of national resources."^
Throughout Japan's series of Defense Buildup Programs,
a budgetary contraint of spending less than one percent of
GNP developed. Although the earlier budgets were approximately
two percent of GNP, by the 1960s the one percent barrier was
firmly established. The upper ceiling on spending for defense
developed as a psychological barrier which the government is
not likely to exceed unless there is a grave crisis. The
people of Japan, always wary of remilitarization, accept the
one percent figure as necessary, if not proper. However,
any discussion of exceeding that limit meets stiff resistance.
Even though Nakasone advocated establishing a parity between
defense and social programs in the budget, this has not been
attempted and probably will not be.
Sakata indicated in his speech to the Foreign Corres-
pondents Club that the trend to more equipment domestically
produced for the Self Defense Forces would be continued. A
domestic capability to manufacture items for the military
contributes to the ability to expand military forces if a
crisis should arise. He indicated that a greater emphasis
would be placed on research and development in order to reduce







design and production of weapons systems. Sakata feels that:
11 As a fundamental principle, I would say that it is
desirable in any sovereign country with self defense
capabilities to have a production base for munitions.
And, in fact, most of the rifles, many of the ships, and
most of the tanks we have are produced in Japan with our
own technology. "76
The Japanese arms industry actually got its start during
the Korean War, and many people, including former Prime Minister
Yoshida credited the arms industry with beginning Japanese
economic recovery. Since that time the Japanese arms industry
has gradually expanded to produce about $1 billion worth of
equipment annually. (See Table 7 in the Appendix for a list of
the top ten Japanese arms producers) . Much of the equipment,
of course, is produced under license from US companies, as was
discussed previously. In recent years, however, Japan has
begun to design and produce domestically many of the items
it previously purchased. This is an important continuation
of the trend to more self reliance on the part of Japan.
The move from grant aid to purchasing and licensing is being
extended to domestic design and production. Although much
of the equipment is relatively unsophisticated the trend is
toward more sophisticated items. According to the Baltimore
Sun on 21 July 1975, a Mitsubishi designed tank has features
more sophisticated than US models. The tank:







American tanks, can be raised or lowered in any or all of
its four corners to conform with, rough terrain. The
amphibious version allegedly could protect is passengers
from nuclear radiation and with minor modifications,
carry soldiers from Japan to the Asian continent . "77
In the past few years Japan's aircraft industry also
began to design and produce new aircraft. The T-2 supersonic
trainer and its support fighter version, the FST-2, are totally
designed by Japan. Japan also designed and manufactures
the C-l transport and the MU-2 utility plane. These develop-
ments, especially the design and production of supersonic
aircraft indicate that Japan is placing increased emphasis
on research and development which will lead to more autonomy
in weapons procurement.
The figures shown in Table 7 of the Appendix, of course,
include items made under license. However, it is significant
that of total military procurement of $1.5 billion in 1974,
$1.2 billion was manufactured domestically, and more than half
of all orders were filled by the top tsn companies. This
confirms Sakata's statement that Japan will attempt to manu-
facture domestically as much of its military equipment as
possible. The establishment of a base of production will
provide an important capability to expand production in time
of crisis. According to one article, Japan's arms industry
could expand to the point where it would be capable of producing
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7 8$15 to $20 billion worth of equipment annually.
It would be difficult for Japan to expand its arms industry
to such, a high level without making basic changes in is arms
export policy. Prime Minister Miki, in a report to the upper
house of the Diet on January 28, 197 6, reiterated Japan's
position on the export of arms. He stated that the government
had no intention of changing its three principles regarding
the ban on overseas arms sales. The ban applies to communist
countries, countries under UN sanctions, and nations involved
79
or believed to be involved in international conflicts.
Fumihiko Kono, advisor to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries,
stated recently that Japan must consider exporting weapons to
pay for foreign oil. Mr. Kono said:
"Arms exports will enable Japan to obtain oil. Oil
producing nations like Iran and Saudi Arabia want weapons
rather than industrial plants. Japan pays a huge amount
of foreign exchange to oil producing countries to buy their
oil, but there's very little they want to buy from Japan." 80
Kono's conviction is not shared by members of the Diet, however.
On February 4, 197 6, the House budget committee was thrown
into confusion over conflicting government replies to a question
over Japan's weapons exports. Mr. Masaki of the Komeito Party
insisted that a total of nearly 12 million Yen worth of
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ammunition had been exported to countries banned by govern-
ment policy in the past five years. These countries included
both North and South Korea, China, South Africa, and North
Vietnam. The "ammunition" turned out to be harpoons and
rivets, which are included in the category of guns, ammuni-
81
tion and their equivalents. The story shows that Japan has
a long way to go before Mr. Kono's prediction that "arms
exports are needed unavoidably to get oil," will be recog-
nized by the government of Japan.
According to one Department of Defense source, however,
Japan has approached the United States unofficially concerning
the manufacture of older models of US equipment for export.
Such items as spare parts for models of missile systems and
airplanes no longer used by US forces would probably be con-
sidered. Many times these items are not economical for US
manufacturers because changes in .new models have eliminated
certain parts. Even though US forces only receive the newer
models, many other countries who have only the older ones
still need replacement parts. This might be an area where
Japan could gain some foreign exchange with oil countries;
however, the government ban on exports would still have to
be changed.
The growth of the defense industry and the results of the
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four Defense Buildup Programs still leaves some question as
to the actual capability of the Self Defense Forces. The
increase in size and capability of the SDF leads to the conclu-
sion that it has assumed the former US responsibility for
Japan's external defense. According to a National Defense
Council staff report prepared in 1966, Japan during the 1970s
would face three potential threats: nuclear attack, convention-
al attack, and large scale internal disorders which could
82
develop into a war of national liberation.
For countering the nuclear threat, Japan intends to rely
entirely on the US deterrent. Against conventional attack,
the policy is to cooperate with the United States within the
terms of the Mutual Security Treaty. Although Japan is cap-
able of preventing infiltration and repelling probing attacks,
it could not cope with a large scale invasion. Although
official ammunition reserves are calculated on a basis of
83
two months, they would probably be used up in a week or less.
In effect, then, the Japanese still rely on US forces to deter
a large scale conventional attack. If support from the US
was lacking, the last line of defense against the invader











Japan's forces are capable of handling internal security,
preventing infiltration, and repelling probing attacks. Despite
the growth of the SDF since 1954, it still must rely primarily
on the US for external defense. The Self Defense Forces
insure that a potential attack on Japan will be of a large
enough magnitude that Japan can invoke the Security Treaty.
Beyond this, the mission of the Self Defense Forces is essen-
84






VII. STRAINS IN THE ALLIANCE
Strains of varying degrees and types have occurred in
the US-Japanese alliance since the beginning of the arrange-
ment. As discussed earlier, one result of these differences
was the revision of the Security Treaty in 1960. Although
intended to make the treaty more equal in its treatment of
Japan, while preserving security goals of both nations, the
revised treaty did not totally eliminate differences of opinion
between the two parties. Strains and misunderstandings occurred
as a result of changes in the world situation, redefinition of
US commitments, and growth of Japan's power and self image.
Despite attempts to alleviate them, many differences remain
which affect the security agreement.
Economic strains developed as Japan's economy recovered
from the devastation of World War II. By the late 1960s Japan
had emerged not only as the largest overseas trading partner
of the United States, but also as its largest competitor. As
Japan's search for overseas markets intensified, it was inevitable
that competition become more intense. Charges of Japanese
unfair business practices became widespread among US firms whose
profits were declining under increased competition. The so-
called "Kennedy round" and the General Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs CGATT) eased problems somewhat, but recent charges by
US manufacturers that Japan is still "dumping", or charging less
for the same product in the US than it sells for in Japan,
indicate that the problem still exists.
96

In terms of effects on the security relationship, the
high cost of maintaining US troops and bases in Japan had a
severe effect on the balance of payments between the two
countries. In 1969, the Pentagon estimated that the cost of
maintaining overseas commitments for that year was $43 billion,
or slightly more than half the FY7 defense budget of $8
billion. Congressional estimates set the figure at $50 billion,
85
not including $2.6 billion requested for military aid. Chart
8 of the Appendix shows the effects of defense-related balance
of payments with Japan which the United States felt had grown
to an intolerable level. Although the balance of payments
deficit for military-related items was partially resolved by
actions taken by President Nixon, this was not accomplished
without considerable ill feelings on the part of the Japanese.
Japan, of course, must look to its own economic health
in its trade policy. The rapidly increasing price of oil
especially was felt by Japan. During the Arab-Israeli War of
1973, Japan felt it necessary to pursue an independent course
in relations with the belligerents. While the United States
supported Israel and expected its allies to do likewise, Japan
secured its supply of oil by condemning Israel and expressing
sympathy with the Arab side. This was an important digression
for Japanese foreign policy which indicates that Japan is
willing to make hard decisions contrary to US policy when
85
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necessary. In the future, as competition for markets
and resources becomes more intense, strains involving economic
issues will probably increase in frequency and intensity.
Political strains have also had effects on the US-
Japanese Alliance. The Japanese people at times have questioned
whether the Security Treaty value to Japan outweighs its dis-
advantages. Some Japanese critics claim that the right of the
United States to use bases to support military action in other
areas of the Far East is dangerous to Japanese security. Many
Japanese deny any threat to Japan from either the Soviet Union
or China, and fear that US actions could result in war for
Japan. Although the Japanese government has the right to veto
the use of US forces in Japan in other areas, critics complain
that the right of prior consultation was never invoked by Japan
during the Vietnam War. This is given as proof that the Japanese
government has been too compliant in bowing to American desires.
US Forces in Japan, although generally on good terms with
the Japanese public, have not always been on best behavior. Even
a few incidents of violence make a strong impression on the
Japanese. The bases, furthermore, are a reminder of the US
Occupation of Japan. Even though the relationship between the
two countries has altered considerably since the Occupation, the
growing sense of pride and self confidence of the Japanese people
make it difficult to accept US bases and the ever increasingly
valuable land they are located upon.
Changes in East Asia tension levels led to perhaps the
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greatest strain on the alliance. There is a general lack
of concern in Japan for threats to security because there
has been little tension in the area which has affected Japan
directly. While critics contended that US actions might
drag Japan into war during the Vietnam era, the new argument
is that the Mutual Security Treaty is unnecessary because of
recent events. These critics claim that because of detente,
better relations between the US and China, and Japan and China,
combined with better North and South Korean relations, and the
Sino-Soviet split, there is no need to worry about security in
Japan. As one DOD official put it. "Perhaps we have done too
good a job in providing security for Japan." It seems possible
that the lack, of public concern for security in Japan resulted
because the Mutual Security Treaty has been so effective.
Although the critics claim that the treaty limits Japan's
pursuit of independent foreign policy, especially with respect
to communist countries, Foreign Minister Ohira in 197 2 claimed
that the treaty actually caused better Sino-Japanese relations.
China, he stated, wants the Security Treaty to counter the
threat of Soviet hegemony in East Asia. This was confirmed by
Chou En-lai's support of a larger Japanese defense effort in
86
discussions with Prime Minister Tanaka in 1972. Nonetheless,
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it is difficult for the Japanese government to justify to
its people the need for a high state of readiness in the
absence of threat.
Within Japan, opposition parties and the general public
have kept pressure on the ruling Liberal Democrat Party to
limit or eliminate defense spending. Criticism has centered
on Article IX of the Constitution which forbids Japan to main-
tain armed forces or war potential. Judge Fukushima of the
Sapporo High Court declared on September 7, 1973, that the
Self Defense Forces were indeed unconstitutional. He claimed
that "merely because they are needed for the defense of the
country cannot provide the grounds for denying that they are
87
war potential or armed forces."
On October 20, 1973, the Yomiuri Newspaper conducted a
poll which showed that 3 4% of the respondents supported the
Fukushima decision, while 31.8% did not (34.2% answered don't
know or no response). However, 45.7% felt that the SDF should
be retained until the Supreme Court reviewed the decision, and
41.7% felt the Supreme Court would overturn the decision. In
the event the decision should stand, only 19.6% felt the
constitution should be revised and the SDF made a clear-cut
armed force. The results of this poll show that the Japanese
public holds a rather ambivalent attitude toward the SDF.
Although fairly evenly split on whether or not the SDF is
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constitutional, apparently only about 20% of the respondents
88
felt that Japan should have "clear-cut armed forces."
The lack, of public understanding and support of the need
for the SDF is one of the basic problems which the government
of Japan is attempting to address. Directors General Nakasone
and Sakata both recognized the need to educate the population
on the necessity and desirability of the Self Defense Forces.
In a report prepared by the Committee to Consider National
Defense in 1975, the members stated:
"...public ambiguity on the need for a strong
national defense is coupled with the fact that on practical
defense issues, public opinion is divided in a thousand
different directions. .. It is vital that the government
swiftly unify its views on defense issues, and then place
those issues before the public to seek national understanding
and cooperation." Furthermore, "...national defense efforts
are meaningless without public approval, and the Japanese
people show little or no concern about defense issues. "89
Opposition parties have also been instrumental in
establishing the one percent of GNP limit on defense spending.
Officially, the platforms of opposition parties call for the
complete dissolution of the Mutual Security Treaty, followed
by some form of neutralism and disbanding of the SDF. Although
the opposition has no voice in the writing of the government
budget, they do have the power to paralyze the Diet and prevent
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force the resignation of Prime Minister Miki, and was a great
embarassment to the ruling LDP. However, as long as the budget
has been held to less than one percent of GNP, opposition parties
have acquiessed. Defense Agency officials have attempted to
persuade the Finance Ministry to increase defense budget requests
to around two percent of GNP on several occasions. However,
fears that this would cause an eruption in the Diet (as well as
90
among factions of the LDP) brought a prompt veto. The LDP
has recently suffered election losses and the resulting gains
by opposition parties could affect future defense spending.
The one percent restriction has brought outcries from some
members of the US Congress. Faced with the high cost of the
Vietnam War, high inflation rates, and unfavorable balances df
trade with Japan, and disillusion with US military involvement
in Asia, some government leaders feel that Japan is getting a
"free ride" when it comes to paying for security. This attitude
could become even more prevalent should economic difficulties
between the United States and Japan become more pronounced.
Lack of concern for defense issues has made it difficult
for the United States to accept Japan as a full partner in the
alliance. Although there have been attempts, mainly by the
Japanese, to rectify this through regular meetings at the
ministerial level, results have been limited. Lack of concern
for the importance of Japan in the alliance was the response of
90
Buck, Op_. cit .
, p. 55., 1975
102

many US leaders; this is in turn created ill feelings among
Japanese at being treated as a "Junior partner". The resulting
stress reached its zenith with the Nixon trip to China. Known
as the "Nixon shock" to the Japanese, because of the lack of
consultation with Japan prior to the trip, it seemed a deliberate
attempt to demonstrate US lack of concern for the alliance. As
President Nixon said in his State of the World Message of 1972:
"Until this year, the Japanese still tended to consider
that their dependence upon us limited independent political
initiatives of our own, while their political problems
commended some independence of initiative on their part. .
.
we recognize that our actions have accelerated the Japanese
trend toward more autonomous policies ... (this is) desirable
because it is a necessary step in the transformation of
our relationship to the more mature and reciprocal partner-
ship required in the 1970s." 91
President Nixon seemed to be reminding Japan that US foreign
policy was made in Washington, not Tokyo, and it was time for
Japan to grow up and stand on its own feet. To a Japanese
population that feels it is already suffering under the terms
of the alliance, this indeed was a shock.
Although it seems short-sighted of some Japanese to claim
that the Mutual Security Treaty is no longer necessary because
of reduced tensions, there is no doubt that for the present
there is no overt threat to Japan's security. The Nixon
Doctrine, however, and later statements by President Ford
make it clear that Japan must maintain forces adequate for its
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own defense if it expects to maintain the Mutual Security
Treaty. The retrenchment of US forces following the Vietnam
War, created some fears in Japan concerning the credibility
of the US commitment to Japan's security. Although most
Japanese consider the US pullout from Vietnam a wise move,
there is still some doubt about US future intentions. Fears
have subsided in the past two years; however, many Japanese
feared an outbreak of hostilities in Korea in the aftermath
of the fall of South Vietnam. US reaction to such an outbreak
was uncertain in Japan. Fear of being dragged into war in Korea
competed with fear that the US would not support South Korea.
Tension over Korea subsided with no resolution of how the
allies would have coordinated if hostilities had broken out.
After the furor of the so-called "Three Arrows Plan" of the
196 0s, both governments were relieved that Korea remained
quiet.
Credibility of the US nuclear guarantee has also been
questioned in Japan. Some Japanese feel that the US would
not be willing to risk nuclear war in defense of Japan. Director
General Sakata stated that this fear is groundless if one
understands deterrence. The lack of such understanding on the
part of the Japanese public, he feels, is the reason for
questioning the US nuclear umbrella. Although he may be
correct, as long as the population does not understand, US
credibility will be questioned. This is an area on which




The Japanese public's "nuclear allergy" has also caused
strains on the alliance. The Japanese government has proclaimed
its policy on nuclear weapons to be no manufacture, no use, and
no introduction into Japan. Prior to the reversion of Okinawa
it is likely that the United States stored nuclear weapons there.
When the Ryukyu Islands became a prefecture of Japan once again
in 1972, they also were placed under the Japanese nuclear policy.
There have been widespread accusations by the opposition parties,
however, that the US continues to maintain nuclear weapons on
Okinawa. Recent testimony by Admiral Le Roche (USN retired) also
caused a furor in the Diet. The Admiral alleged that US aircraft
carriers did not unload nuclear weapons prior to calling at
Japanese ports. Although not a direct admission of introducing
nuclear weapons to Japan, it was interpreted as such by
opposition parties. The Japanese population was shocked to learn
of the Admiral's testimony, and this only added to feelings that
the United States does not respect Japan as an equal partner.
Recurring themes in the strains between the two allies
center around the change in the relationship over the years with-
out a corresponding change in responsibilities and status.
Japan is no longer a defeated, occupied country with a small
economic base. It has grown to the third largest GNP in the
world. The confidence which accompanies this status causes
Japan to be sensitive and resentful when slighted. The United
States seems to be lagging behind these changes in its attitude
toward Japan, and continues to treat it as somehow inferior to
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the US. On the other hand, Japan has held on to its dependent
status even while demanding more freedom in its foreign policy.
The refusal to provide more than one percent of GNP for defense,
and to take on more responsibility for its security are coupled
with terms such as "autonomous defense" and cries for more
independence. Although none of the misunderstandings or strains
are threatening to bring the dissolution of the treaty, there
does not seem to be a mechanism for promoting better understanding




There are many yardsticks for measuring the success of an
alliance. One measure of success is the extent to which
individual policies are achieved. The strength of interests
underlying an alliance compared with other interests of a nation
must also be considered. Members of an alliance must agree not
only on general objectives, but also on common policies and
implementation of them. The value of an alliance requires an
examination of specific policies and measures taken by the
contracting parties in implementing the alliance.
There are three main reasons nations form alliances:
security , internal stability, and status. Nations are concerned
only indirectly and conditionally with international stability.
Their concern centers on the degree to which their own security
and status is affected, and their involvement is conditioned
by satisfaction with their role in upholding international
92
security. Thus, the value of an alliance may be measured by
comparing assets and liabilities of available combinations of
alliances. Since each member of an alliance must give up some
measure of flexibility in its foreign policy, the alliance
must be continuously re-evaluated in terms of how well it
compares with other options. The alliance will endure only if
it continues to be the most advantageous option open to its
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The alliance between the United States and Japan was
formed on the common interests, or at least compatible
interests of the two nations. Japan, weak and unable to
provide its defense, needed the alliance to insure security
while rebuilding its economy and government. The close
relationship with the United States which developed during
the Allied Occupation made the US the only logical choice for
an ally. Events of the late 1940s and early 1950s convinced
the Japanese government that the communist powers constituted
a threat to its security which only the United States could
counter. Initially conceived as a temporary arrangement until
such time as the United Nations could guarantee peace, the
Japanese felt that the alliance was as good a bargain as any
available. They were willing to give up some autonomy in return
for security by allowing US forces to be stationed in Japan
and conceding the necessity to form a small military force.
The alliance provided for additional internal security
for Japan by allowing US forces to be used to quell disturb-
ances in conjunction with Japan's forces. Although this clause
was never invoked, it gave the government of Japan assurance
of American help if it were needed to preserve order within
the country. Japan also gained status with other countries
in Asia by allying with the United States. It is unlikely that
the growth of Japan's economy and stature would have been as
smooth and rapid without the alliance with the United States.
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The United States, as the leader of the "free world,"
and very concerned with the threat to peace of the communist
movement, also desired the alliance. Although secondarily
concerned with preventing the resurgence of militarism in
Japan, events on the Asian mainland provided the main threat
to US security goals in Asia. Soviet Communism, combined with
communist victory in China and the invasion of South Korea,
convinced the United States that alliance with Japan was
desirable.
The Security Treaty provided the United States with bases
in Japan which were helpful in fulfilling US security goals.
The decision to pursue a non-punitive peace treaty and a security
agreement with Japan was slow in coming to the United States.
However, the goals were reached with US security interests in
mind and should be justified on that basis. The physical
security of Japan was secondary to the US goal of preventing
hostile hegemony in Asia. To project US power into the region
of East Asia, it was desirable to have secure base areas in
Japan for the stationing of US troops. The ability to use those
troops in other parts of East Asia was an important goal of the
United States. This was confirmed by the Nixon-Sato Communique
and more recently by the Ford-Miki meeting. Although the use
of troops is subject to prior consultation with the Japanese
government under the terms of the present treaty, overall Asian
stability is an important part of US foreign policy.
Initially the United States was willing to provide a large
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amount of Grant Aid to Japan with which to increase the
capability of its forces. Japan, in order to qualify for this
aid, reorganized the structure and role of its military forces.
Although staying within the provisions of Articles IX and
XVIII of the Constitution, the capabilities of the Self Defense
Forces were increased considerably.
As Japan's economy recovered, Grant Aid was no longer
appropriate. The US chafed at Japan's low level of defense
expenditures, and Japan wanted more independence in making
foreign policy. The conflict was resolved partially by Kishi's
efforts to revise the Security Treaty. The revision, however,
was made with the realization that Japan would have to pay for
increased autonomy with a greater share of responsibility. The
revision was made in a era of reduced tension in East Asia, and
many of the clauses of the original treaty were changed to the
satisfaction of the Japanese government.
Although the alliance remained intact, Japan began to pay
cash for equipment it had previously received as Grant Aid. As
its economy recovered fully during the 1960s, more and more of
this equipment was manufactured in Japan. A series of Defense
Buildup Programs provided the basis for a cautious expansion of
defense capability. Always remaining within one percent of GNP,
the Self Defense Forces were supplied with modern equipment and
Japanese industry acquired the ability to manufacture it
domestically. Licensing fees and sales of equipment to Japan
provided foreign exchange to help offset the high cost of
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maintaining US troops in Japan.
The security arrangement has not been free of strains.
As Japan's economic strength grew, it became the largest
competitor as well as largest overseas trading partner of the
United States. The intense competition for world markets
continues to be a sensitive area for both countries. As
balance of payment deficits became larger, President Nixon
took action to force changes in currency exchange rates.
Although this has eased problems somewhat for the United
States, Japan has still not fully recovered from the sting
of the Nixon "shock".
Other strains in the US-Japan alliance have been caused
by different outlooks on defense. The people of Japan,
generally, do not perceive much threat to their security. In
their opinion, the Mutual Security Treaty has given more
benefit to the United States than to Japan. US bases and the
presence of foreign troops are a reminder of the Occupation of
Japan following World War II. This, many Japanese feel, does
not reflect accurately the present day status of their country.
The small defense budget and questionable constitutionality
of the Self Defense Forces have led to strains also. Many US
leaders do not feel Japan is supporting its own security needs
satisfactorily. Claims that Japan is "getting a free ride"
in defense while using defense savings to increase economic
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competition are common. The Japanese government, feeling that
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the public and opposition parties will protest greater defense
expenditures, has not allowed defense costs to exceed one
percent of GNP. Larger percentage budget requests from the
Defense Agency have consistently been denied.
Despite the strains and restriction of budget, the alliance
has satisfactorily met the security goals it was designed to
meet. There are several areas which might be improved, however.
The first, and probably most important is the need for better
coordination and communication between the two countries. The
United States government must realize the uniqueness of the status
of the Japanese Self Defense Forces. It is highly unlikely that
Japan will revise either Article TX or Article XVIII of its
constitution. War making capability and involuntary service in
the military will therefore remain unconstitutional. It is
also unlikely that Japan will increase defense expenditure
beyond the unofficial limit of one percent of GNP. Furthermore,
in the absence of dire threat to security, it is unlikely that
a large defense force would gain the support of the general
public. Like a mathematical equation, these are the constraints,
or "givens", that must be worked with to solve the problem.
On the other hand, the Japanese government must realize
that the United States probably will not continue indefinitely
to pay the large costs of maintaining troops in Japan. As
Japan's economy grows further, it will probably be seen as more
threatening by the United States. Faced with ever rising
defense costs, it will be tempting for the United States r
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to seek greater compensation from Japan.
Efforts by the Japanese Defense Agency to promote greater
awareness of the need for defense and the value of the alliance
to Japan should also be increased. Although both Nakasone and
Sakata stated this as a goal of their administrations, effects
seem limited. SDF members are still barred from many
universities and their status appears to have declined since
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the late 1960s. Campaigns to promote the goal of "greater
defense consciousness" are needed to point out the value of
the alliance to Japan. This will not be an easy task for the
Japanese government, but it is an important one if the alliance
is to be maintained.
Although Japan has renamed and restructured its defense
forces twice during the term of the alliance, further moves
to restructure would benefit the agreement. Faced with
budget restrictions and a shortage of manpower, a more
extensive reservist program would seem beneficial. At the
present time there are only 40,000 men authorized in the Ground
Forces Reserve. This is an extremely small pool to draw upon
in time of crisis. The United States, faced also with budget
restriction, has been successful in allocating responsibilities
to National Guard and Reserve units. This seems to be a way
for Japan to gain the more autonomous defense stated as a
goal of the Defense Agency without incurring inordinate expenses
94
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The present rank structure of the SDF, which is heavy with
officers and senior enlisted personnel, would lend itself
well to such a reserve program. A reserve plan would, of
course, depend on the success of the government's efforts
to promote awareness of defense needs among the public.
If tensions in the East Asian region remain at the
relatively low level of the past few years, it seems likely
that the United States can continue safely to reduce force
levels in Japan. If this is coupled with increased capability
of the SDF, security goals of the two countries can continue
to be met while reducing the irritant of foreign troops in
Japan.
While Japan should increase its capability against
conventional and unconventional attack, there seems to be little
justification for developing an independent nuclear capability.
Public sentiment in Japan against such a move, combined with
the high costs of development mitigate against it. Although
the US nuclear guarantee has been questioned by some in Japan,
its validity seems current today. Further efforts by the
Defense Agency to explain concepts of deterrence might aid in
maintaining confidence in the US nuclear guarantee.
The trend of the alliance over the past twenty-five years
has been good in many respects. Japan has gradually taken on
more responsihioity for defense despite remaining deficiencies.
The move from Grant Aid to sales to licensing, and finally to
domestic design is a beneficial trend. It demonstrates Japan's
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willingness to assume more responsibility while at the same
time building up a defense industry capable of expansion in
time of crisis. A gradual reduction of reliance on the US
for equipment has befitted Japan's changing status, but
ammunition stockpiles should be increased. Because of the
small size of the SDF , Japan will probably continue to import
some equipment from the United States for reasons of economy;
however, it seems to be mutually beneficial for Japan to have
the capacity to manufacture many of its needed defense articles,
A strong Japanese defense industry helps promote the US goal
of preventing hegemony by hostile powers in East Asia, while
enhancing Japan's goal of secure borders.
The general objectives of the alliance have been met with
good success. The costs to both parties has been reasonable
and the terms of the 196 Mutual Security Treaty seem flexible
enough to continue to meet the security goals of the two
parties. As Japan increases independent foreign policy initia-
tives, the two countries should renew efforts to cooperate in
maintaining security objectives. Japan and the United States
should continue to provide first rate equipment for the SDF,
and increase capabilities to coordinate forces for the defense




A major problem of researching military transfers is the
lack of definitive sources. Such traditional publications
as the Military Balance and those of the Stockholm Interna-
tional Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) are lacking for various
reasons. One reason is the wide range of definitions of
military equipment. Borderline cases such as trucks, medical
supplies, and uniforms are treated differently by different
sources. In other cases, figures published by non-government
organizations such as the two above cannot even remotely be
reconciled with those published by government agencies. A
case in point is the SIPRI estimate of Japanese arms exports.
Their figures place the value at approximately $16 5 million
for the years 1950-1968. Japanese government figures for the
same period set the value at only $40 million.
Part of the disparity of sources can be attributed to
differences in accounting methods. For example, should a five
year old airplance given as grant aid be valued at its original
cost/:, an amortized cost based on its age, or its replacement
cost? The method used results in grossly different figures
for its value. When these problems of definition and accounting
are multiplied over the twenty-five years of the US-Japan
alliance, the possibility of accurately reporting transfers
becomes remote.
Wide disparities are also evident between US and Japanese
official government sources. Japanese figures show over $200
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million of military aid received from the US from FY51-53.
US figures for the same time period are zero. Similar accounting
differences are present among various US government agencies.
The methodology used throughout this paper to attempt
to cope with the above problems are as follows:
1. If only one source of material for the time period or
equipment was available, that source was used.
2. Priority was given to actual numbers of equipment over
the cost of the equipment.
3. For consistency, figures provided by the US Department
of Defense were given priority over all other sources. Other
sources for the same time periods which conflicted with DOD
figures are noted for comparison.
4. IF DOD figures for a period were not available, they were
taken from other US government agencies, if possible.
5. When no US government data were available, data from
Japanese government sources were used if available.
6. If no US or Japanese official government data were
available for the information desired, unofficial non-govern-
ment sources were used. Such publications included the






MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS DELIVERIES
CVALUE IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)




















































































SELECTED ITEMS/CATEGORIES NUMBER DELIVERED







Total Communications Eqpt. Value $8 6,093.
Total Other Equipment Value $12,431.
Total Construction Value $8,245.
Total Rehabilitated Equip. Value $11,065.
Total Supply Operations Value $6 9,213.
Total Training Value $44,591.









MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM DELIVERIES
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)





1950 55.8 -0- 1.5
1951 980.0 -0- 9:5 10.8 6.8
1952 1,481.0 -0- 38.4 .8 11.2
1953 4,159.0 -0- 173.8 3.7 34.5
1954 3,296.0 .5 154.3 3.4 12.0
1955 2,396.0 39.4 297.1 20.2 15.8
1956 2,920.0 97.9 345.2 201.5 33.2
1957 2,078.0 111.0 169.7 258.8 23.7
1958 2,325.0 130.9 149.6 331.1 21.1
1959 2,050.0 131.5 232.7 190.6 20.5
1960 1,697.0 85.8 135.9 187.1 19.5
1961 1,344.0 66.9 84.4 192.1 23.6
1962 1,427.0 74.0 84.4 136.9 20.5
1963 1,806.0 34.2 85.2 167.8 24.3
1964 1,116.0 28.0 108.2 140.1 16.4
1965 1,100.0 20.0 100.2 148.1 10.4
1966 1,071.0 1.2 76.5 153.1 26.0
1967 1,011.0 29.1 70.4 149.8 21.0
1968 790.0 3.6 115.0 197.4 29.1
1969 645.0 .3 55.3 210.0 18.8
1970 544.0 .5 37.9 216.3 15.7
1971 559.0 -0- 18.7 140.5 16.5
1972 555.0 -0- 19.7 164.3 16.0
1973 524.0 -0- 11.5 113.4 14.2
1974 716.0 -0- 54.3 91.1 15.9
1975 766.0 -0- 8.1 137.5 14.9
TOTAL 37,413.0 854.9 2,636.1 3,556.5 483.4




FOREIGN MILITARY SALES DELIVERIES 1950-1975
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
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U.S. COMMERCIAL SALES DELIVERIES
CMILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
YEAR WORLD JAPAN AUSTRA- N . ZEA- S. KO- TAI- PHILIP-
LIA LAND REA WAN PINES
FY60-64 955.1 120.1 1.1 0.1 0.7 1.0 0.7
FY65 155.8 8.5 1.0 0.3 -0- 0.6 -0-
FY66 196.4 18.3 3.7 0.3 -0- 0.7 -0-
FY67 237.9 25.4 8.3 0.1 1.6 0.7 -0-
FY68 257.1 30.3 0.6 0.1 0.6 1.2 0.2
FY69 250.8 40.0 1.4 0.4 1.9 1.9 0.4
FY70 437.6 62.5 1.9 -0- 1.1 2.8 -0-
FY71 396.8 71.5 1.6 0.6 2.0 7.8 0.5
FY72 423.6 20.8 14.5 0.6 0.7 5.4 0.3
FY73 362.1 39.7 5.9 0.6 0.2 6.0 0.2
FY74 502.2 58.6 5.6 0.6 1.1 8.1 2.0
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JAPAN'S TOP TEN ARMS PRODUCERS 1974












18.4 Aircraft, repair work,
ships, weapons







7 Nihon Seikozyo 17.7 1.5 Weapons
8 Shinmeiwa 17.7 1.5 Aircraft repair
9 Mitsui Zosen 17.3 1.5 Ships
10 Toshiba 17.0 1.5 Communications and
Electric radar equipment
TOTAL (TOP TEN) 740.5 63 . 3





DEFENSE TRANSACTIONS IN THE












US DIRECT DEFENSE EXPENSES
JAPAN AND OKINAWA (DEBIT)
US BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT
(1963-1974 Total $8.3 billion)
TRANSFERS TO JAPAN UNDER FMS (CREDIT)
-j r
1963 64 65 66 67 6*
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